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any areas of public policy are characterized by 
an increasing emphasis on devolution, i.e., direct 
stakeholder participation in the policy formation 
process. In some cases, this participation extends to 
the actual design of the policies that will ultimately be 
implemented. The trend toward devolution has been 
particularly significant in the area of water policy de-
sign where the goal is to design policies that are not 
only environmentally and economically sustainable 
but also politically viable. Examples abound, ranging 
from Armenia to Palestine to the United States. One 
such collective negotiation among stakeholders, the 
so-called Three-Way Negotiations that took place in 
the early 1990s in California, was analyzed in Adams, 
Rausser, and Simon. Other, more recent examples 
of devolution include large-scale, rural-urban water 
transfers in the U.S.-Mexico border region (examined 
in Frisvold and Emerick), the San Francisco Estuary 
Project, and the Sacramento Water Forum. In France 
the idea of devolution has been institutionalized in 
the water law promulgated in 1992. This law speci-
fies that specific development plans be set up at the 
level of each hydrological basin and that water regu-
lations be negotiated at the smaller, catchment scale. 
It is required that regulations be negotiated locally 
between all stakeholders under the supervision of 
local authorities.1
Although stakeholder negotiation is an increas-
ingly important policymaking tool, relatively little 
is understood about the interactions between the 
structure of the negotiating process and the inter-
ests of the participating stakeholders. How do these 
considerations influence the negotiated outcome? In 
this monograph we analyze the nature of stakeholder 
power within a negotiation, focusing on how this 
power is affected by the structure of the negotiation 
process and the relationship between the interests of 
the participants. Understanding these interactions is 
important for negotiation participants and for policy 
makers designing such processes.
For our purposes, we define bargaining power 
as the capacity of a stakeholder to influence the 
negotiated outcome in order to increase the utility he 
receives in the equilibrium of the negotiation game. 
We are interested in the bargaining power wielded by a 
subset of stakeholders whose interests are sufficiently 
aligned so that they may be thought of as a loose 
coalition. In our case the coalition consists of farmers 
who are located at different points along a river. While 
these farmers compete with each other for water, their 
interests are more closely aligned with each other than 
with the other stakeholders at the table, particularly 
those representing environmental and other nonag-
ricultural uses of water. We analyze three questions 
related to the bargaining power of our coalition. First, 
what are the sources of bargaining power and how do 
they interact? Second, is it ever advantageous for some 
or all of the coalition members to cede their seats at 
the bargaining table to a “spokesman” charged with 
the task of representing their joint interests? Third, 
how does the definition of the bargaining space (i.e., 
the vector of variables over which negotiations take 
place and the restrictions imposed on these variables) 
affect bargaining power and the resulting utilities of 
participants? In particular, in some of the bargaining 
spaces we consider, individual farmers are permit-
ted to pursue their own interests at the expense of 
the interests of the coalition as a whole by allocating 
more water to their own subbasins at lower prices 
than other farmers pay. Do coalition members benefit 
when restrictions are imposed on the degree to which 
they can distinguish their own interests from those of 
other farmers?
Understanding the factors determining the 
answers to such questions will facilitate the design of 
negotiation processes that represent the interests of 
all stakeholders in an implementable and sustainable 
fashion. At an intuitive level, stakeholders’ power in 
the negotiation process is measured by their “access” 
to the decisionmaking process. Access is a catchall 
term for many considerations, including the number 
of representatives included in the process, the capac-
ity to set agendas, placement on key committees, etc. 
We demonstrate that the prima facie benefits of access 
1  Loi N92-3 du 3 janvier 1992, Journal Officiel de la République Française du 4 janvier 1992. See also Jiang.
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can be dominated by other, more subtle kinds of 
negotiating power arising from the nature of the inter-
actions between stakeholders and from the structure 
of the bargaining environment. If a negotiation process 
is to fairly represent all interests, these interactions 
must be taken into consideration when policy makers 
design the negotiation process.
In order to address these questions, we model 
a specific instance of negotiations over the use and 
storage of water in the upper Adour Basin in south-
western France. The upper Adour Basin is a water 
catchment area that extends from the Adour’s source 
in the Pyrenees mountains to its junction with the 
Midouze River. It consists of three subbasins separated 
by points where minimum water flows are measured 
by the French government. For our purposes, this 
negotiation process has a number of advantages as 
a research topic. First, the negotiation process is 
well-defined and relatively transparent. The national 
government clearly specified the rules determining 
participants as well as the outcome in the event that 
the parties were unable to negotiate a solution. Under 
the specified structure, the participants reached an ini-
tial agreement regarding the guiding principles of the 
negotiation process within a year: They agreed to initi-
ate and fund studies regarding future water needs and 
supplies, farmers agreed to fund a significant share of 
management and maintenance costs, and stakehold-
ers agreed on a total water volume for consumptive 
purposes, which is one of the three critical variables 
we model. However, the second stage of negotiations 
deadlocked over the other two critical issues we 
examine here: allocating water among farmers and 
managing limited supplies during droughts (Thoyer et 
al. (2004)). Second, our modeling task is facilitated by 
the availability of extensive information regarding the 
scientific and economic relationships that affect stake-
holder preferences (Gleyses and Morardet; Faysse). 
The underlying hydrology of the river basin is well 
documented (Faysse and Morardet). A great deal of 
information is available regarding the agricultural use 
of water, in terms of both quantities used and the value 
of the resulting production. This information provides 
us with hydrologic and economic parameters for our 
simulation analysis. Third, two types of environmental 
goals are recognized explicitly by participants: the 
value of “residual flows,”2 which promote aquatic life, 
and the scenic costs of dams, which destroy attractive 
valley landscapes. These two goals compete with each 
other and with farmers’ use of water for production 
purposes. Finally, the natural division of farmers by 
subbasin provides us with a subset of “natural allies:” 
a coalition consisting of stakeholders whose interests 
are similar but not perfectly aligned. The quality of 
the data and institutional information provides us 
with a rich and realistic simulation environment for 
examining the effect of process structure on partici-
pant power.
The monograph is organized as follows. In section 
2 we review the Rausser-Simon multilateral bargaining 
model (referred to as the MB model), which provides 
the theoretical basis for this application. Section 3 
relates the MB model to the literature on multilateral 
negotiations. Section 4 introduces the Adour Basin, 
explains the nature of the negotiations and describes 
our simulation model of the bargaining problem. 
Section 5 contains our comparative statics analysis. 
Section 6 concludes.
2  Residual flows are total flows net of agricultural usage. See section 4.2 for a more complete definition.Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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2. ThE UNDERLyING BARGAINING FRAmEwORk
T
he analytical framework for this study is the non-
cooperative MB model developed in Rausser and 
Simon and applied in Adams, Rausser, and Simon. In 
this section we review the main features of the model, 
drawing extensively from the presentation in section 
2 of Adams, Rausser, and Simon. Complementing 
the vast theoretical literature on bilateral bargaining 
spawned by the seminal work of Rubinstein, the MB 
framework is designed specifically as an application 
tool to analyze complex multi-issue, multiplayer bar-
gaining problems. It has no closed-form solution and 
so must be solved using computational techniques.
The specification of a multilateral bargaining 
problem includes a finite set of players denoted by 
I = {1, • • • , I} and indexed by i. The players meet 
together to select a policy vector from some set x of 
possible alternatives. The set x is assumed to be a 
compact, convex subset of n-dimensional Euclidean 
space where n is the cardinality of the vector of issues 
being negotiated. The policy vector, x, yields player i a 
utility of ui(x) where ui(•) is assumed to be strictly con-
cave on x. We denote by u0 the vector of disagreement 
payoffs, i.e., the payoffs players receive if they fail to 
negotiate an agreement. Throughout this monograph 
we assume that decisions are reached by unanimity, 
i.e., an element of x can be selected as the solution 
to the bargaining problem only if it is accepted by all 
parties at the bargaining table.
A bargaining game is derived from a bargaining 
problem by superimposing upon it a “negotiation 
process.” We begin by formulating a bargaining game 
with a finite number, T, of bargaining rounds. Under 
the conditions we assume, each such game has a 
unique limit dominance solvable (LDS) equilibrium.3 
We then define the solution to the limit bargaining 
game to be the limit of these finite-round equilibria. At 
the beginning of the t ≤ Tth round of the finite game, 
provided that the game has not already concluded by 
this round, nature chooses at random some player 
to be the proposer for this round. Nature’s choice is 
governed by an exogenous probability distribution, 
w = (wi)i∈I where wi ∈ [0, 1]—player i is chosen with 
probability wi—and ∑iwi = 1. Vector w is interpreted 
as a distribution of access to the political system and 
wi is referred to as player i’s access probability.4 The 
player selected by nature makes a proposal, which is 
a policy vector in x, and all players vote on whether 
or not to accept it. The game concludes in this round 
if and only if all players vote to accept the proposal; if 
some player votes against it, play proceeds to the next 
round. If the Tth round of the game is reached and if 
the proposal put forward in this round is rejected, then 
players receive the vector of disagreement payoffs, u0. 
To avoid dealing with degenerate special cases, we 
assume throughout that x contains a proposal that 
strictly Pareto dominates u0.5
There is a simple characterization of the unique 
LDS equilibrium strategies for a game with T rounds 
of bargaining. This characterization is given by the fol-
lowing backward-inductive construction: A proposal 
made by player i in period T is accepted if and only if 
it yields each player j ≠ i a utility level at least as great 
as j’s disagreement utility, u0
j  . Similarly, in round t < T, 
a proposal by i is accepted if and only if it yields each 
j a utility level at least as great as j’s expected utility 
from playing the subgame starting from round t + 1.6 
Thus, the game can be solved recursively, starting from 
the last round: In each round t, player i computes the 
3  Limit dominance solvability is a solution concept that extends in an intuitive way the finite-game notion of trembling-hand 
perfection (Selten) to extensive form games with a continuum of actions. We prove in Rausser and Simon that every bargaining 
game satisfying the conditions assumed in this monograph has a unique LDS equilibrium.
4  Access probabilities are referred to as “recognition probabilities” in the literature spawned by Baron and Ferejohn (1987). 
While some branches of the political economy literature treat the distribution of political power as endogenous, this monograph, 
along with the other bargaining analyses reviewed in section 3, treats this distribution as externally determined.
5  It should be emphasized that this last assumption is not a necessary one; given our other assumptions, however, it is necessary 
and sufficient to ensure the existence of a unique negotiated agreement.
6  In round t + 1, player i is chosen with probability wi to be the proposer. Under the conditions we assume, every proposal that 
is part of an LDS equilibrium profile is accepted. Therefore, j’s expected utility from playing the subgame starting at t + 1 is the 
w-weighted sum of the utilities he obtains from all parties’ proposals in this round.
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policy vector that maximizes i’s utility, subject to the 
constraint that, for each j ≠ i, the vector yields player 
j no less than j’s default utility (if t = T) or j’s expected 
utility conditional on reaching the next round (if t < T). 
Thus, the task for i in each round is to solve a classical 
nonlinear programming problem: maximize a strictly 
concave function on a convex set.7 Our conditions 
ensure that in each round the unique solution to this 
problem will yield i greater utility than i’s expected 
utility, conditional on reaching the next round. It fol-
lows from this construction that, for every finite game, 
there is a unique, stochastic outcome vector consisting 
of a point in x for each player that will be proposed by 
that player if he is chosen in the first round to be the 
proposer. With probability one, players in round one 
accept whichever proposal is made. Given a sequence 
of finite-round bargaining games, all identical except 
that the number of bargaining periods increases 
without bound, any sequence of outcome vectors for 
these games has a unique, deterministic limit in x, 
i.e., all players’ first-round proposals converge to the 
same point in x. Formal details of this construction 
are provided in Rausser and Simon.
We now provide an elementary example, designed 
to provide some intu-
ition  for  the  basic 
mechanics of the model. 
The example, repro-
duced  from  Adams, 
Rausser, and Simon, 
belongs to the class 
of  problems  known 
as spatial problems, in 
which the policy space 
consists of alternative 
locations. Each player 
has a most-preferred 
location called an ideal 
point. We assume that 
the utility derived by a 
player from a particular 
location is a decreasing 
function of the Euclid-
ean distance between 
this location and the player’s ideal point. The example 
illustrates why a deterministic limit solution must 
exist.
There are three players. The space of possible loca-
tions is represented by a triangle in Figure 1. Players’ 
ideal points are at the vertices of the triangle. Player 
i’s access probability will be denoted by wi. Consider a 
game with T rounds of bargaining. For each j, the line 
I j,T in Figure 1 is the level set corresponding to player 
j’s reservation utility in the last round of bargaining: 
Any proposal on this line yields player j a utility level 
equal to j’s disagreement utility. This line is the bound-
ary of player j’s participation constraint on negotiations 
in round T. Player i’s task in this round is to choose 
the point closest to i’s ideal point that satisfies both 
of the other agents’ participation constraints.
The outcome conditional on reaching round T is 
that proposal x j,T will be agreed upon with probability 
wj. Clearly, player i’s expected utility conditional on 
reaching this round is strictly higher than u0
i  since each 
x j,T yields i at least u0
i  while i’s own proposal yields a 
utility strictly higher than u0
i . Thus, i’s participation 
constraint in round T − 1 will be strictly “tighter” than 
in round T. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The set of 
7  The feasible set is convex because it is the intersection of upper contour sets for the other players; these sets are convex because 
all players’ utilities are concave and, hence, quasiconcave.
Figure 1. An Illustration of the Rausser-Simon Model  
(Figure 1 in Adams, Rausser, and Simon)
Player #1’s ideal point
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proposals for which unanimous agreement can be 
obtained—i.e., the set bounded by the I j,T–1s—is strictly 
contained in the set bounded by the I j,Ts. Accordingly, 
the distance between players’ proposals in round T − 1 
is also smaller than in round T. Clearly, however, it 
is strictly better for agent i to propose an alternative 
that will be accepted in the current round than to 
propose an alternative that is rejected and proceed 
to the next round. Proceeding by backward induc-
tion from round T − 1 to the first round, this distance 
between proposals continues to shrink. Thus, if T is 
sufficiently large, the maximum distance between any 
two players’ proposals in the first round of bargaining 
will be arbitrarily small. This is the intuition for why 
in the limit, as T goes to infinity, the solution to the 
game is deterministic, i.e., all negotiators propose the 
same alternative in the first round.Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
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C
ompared with the voluminous literature on 
bargaining between two players over a single 
dimension, the literature on multiplayer, multi-issue 
bargaining problems is relatively sparse. We begin 
with a discussion of the two seminal papers in the 
former literature—Nash and Rubinstein—that have 
strongly influenced the directions in which the latter 
has evolved. Nash’s approach is axiomatic: Given a set, 
S, of possible utility pairs and a disagreement outcome 
(or default payoff), d, Nash identified a unique out-
come in S that satisfies four axioms about bargaining 
outcomes. Extensions of Nash’s original paper—the 
Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Model (ANBM)—introduce 
the possibility of asymmetric “bargaining weights,” 
reflecting the two agents’ relative bargaining power 
(see Roth).
While the first three of Nash’s axioms are innocu-
ous, the fourth, independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA), is highly restrictive. IIA requires that, if a given 
bargaining problem is modified in a way that leaves 
unchanged the “shape” of the bargaining frontier in 
any open neighborhood of the solution to the original 
problem, then the solution to the modified problem 
must coincide with the solution to the original one. 
We argue here that this implication of IIA is highly 
problematic for many real-world applications.
In contrast to Nash’s axiomatic approach, Rubin-
stein’s is strategic. In an infinite-horizon, discrete-time 
model, two players make alternating offers to each 
other concerning the division between them of a 
“pie.” The game has a unique solution that depends 
only upon which player makes the first offer and the 
relative “impatience” (i.e., discount rates) of the two 
players. While their frameworks are entirely differ-
ent, the solutions reached by Nash and Rubinstein 
are closely linked (see Binmore, Rubinstein, and 
Wolinsky and, for further elaboration, Osborne and 
Rubinstein): As the time between offers in Rubinstein’s 
discrete time model goes to zero, the solutions to his 
model converge to the solution to the ANBM with 
bargaining weights that reflect the Rubinstein agents’ 
relative impatience. In this sense, Nash’s axiomatic 
and Rubinstein’s strategic approaches yield “the 
same” solution to the bargaining problem. It follows 
that Rubinstein’s model also exhibits IIA. Indeed, IIA 
plays a central role in the vast literature on the strategic 
approach to bargaining theory that has evolved based 
on Rubinstein’s work. To illustrate, when Rubinstein’s 
model is augmented by providing one of the players 
with an “outside option,”8 this additional strategic 
advantage affects the equilibrium outcome of the game 
only if the outside option provides the player with a 
utility level that strictly exceeds her equilibrium utility 
in the game without the option.
Both the Nash and the Rubinstein approaches 
have been extended to a multiplayer context. Thom-
son and Lensberg include an extensive treatment of 
n-person axiomatic bargaining theory, including Nash 
Bargaining. Krishna and Serrano (KS) construct an 
n-player generalization of Rubinstein’s game in which 
the unique solution to the problem of sharing a pie 
corresponds to the solution of the n-person ANBM. In 
KS’s model, each player can accept or reject the current 
pie-division proposal. Players who accept the proposal 
exit the game and immediately consume their shares 
of the pie; the remaining players continue to bargain 
over what remains. Thus, unanimity is not required 
for agreement. The “pie-eating” structure of this setup 
is clearly restrictive: i’s utility from consuming his 
share is independent of whether or not other players 
are consuming so that the possibility of interpersonal 
externalities is excluded. Kultti and Vartiainen have 
generalized KS’s equivalence result to a general con-
text that admits interpersonal externalities.
The MB model applied in the present monograph 
represents a departure from the Nash-Rubinstein tradi-
tion in that its solution does not exhibit independence 
of irrelevant alternatives. In particular, equilibrium 
outcomes in the MB model depend a great deal on the 
nature of the offers that are made in the final rounds 
of negotiations. By contrast, the absolute levels of 
offers made in the tail of a sequence of Rubinstein 
offers have no influence on the nature of offers made 
at the head of the sequence (i.e., the equilibrium 
8  This extension was first introduced in Shaked and Sutton, Binmore, and Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton.
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offers).9 This distinction has important implications 
for the applicability of Rubinstein-type models to the 
study of certain real-world multilateral bargaining situ-
ations. In the context of collective decisionmaking, an 
impending deadline can provide a dramatic impetus 
to compromise: witness the frequency of last-minute 
resolutions of congressional deadlocks and of post-
midnight compromises in wage negotiations when 
strikes are scheduled for the following morning. To 
the extent that the threats and counterthreats made in 
these final moments of negotiations involve proposals 
that are outside of some neighborhood of the ultimate 
compromise, the solutions of models consistent with 
Nash’s IIA axiom must be invariant with respect to the 
way events unfold at the “eleventh hour.” In the MB 
model, by contrast, these events can have a dramatic 
impact on equilibrium outcomes.10
Of the other multiplayer, noncooperative bargaining 
theoretic papers, most involve some kind of modifi-
cation of Rubinstein’s alternating-offer framework. 
Binmore considers several alternative extensions of 
Rubinstein’s analysis to the problem of “three players 
and three pies.” Each pair of players exercises control 
over the division of a different pie, only one of which 
can be divided. A result attributed to Shaked11 shows 
that, in any infinite-horizon, alternating-offer, three-
player pure-division problem, if unanimity is required 
for agreement and if players are not extremely impa-
tient, then any division of the pie can be implemented 
by subgame-perfect equilibrium strategies.12
An interesting n-player variant of the alternating-
offer model, called the “Proposal-Making Model,” has 
been advanced by Selten (1981). A player is selected by 
nature to make the first proposal. He proposes a utility 
vector, a coalition, and a “responder.” The responder 
either accepts or rejects. If he rejects, the responder 
then proposes a new utility vector, a new coalition, 
and a new responder. If he accepts, the responder 
designates another member of the coalition as the next 
responder and so on until all members of a coalition 
have agreed to some proposal. This model has been 
studied extensively in Chatterjee et al. and by Bennett, 
writing alone and with various coauthors.13
Manzini and Mariotti have studied multilateral 
bargaining problems in which an n-member alliance 
negotiates with another party. In their framework, 
bargaining proceeds in two stages. The “outer stage” 
is a standard Rubinstein two-person alternating-offer 
bargaining game. During the “inner stage,” alliance 
members negotiate among themselves over the choice 
of a proposal; once they have agreed, the proposal is 
offered to the other party as part of the outer stage. In 
Manzini and Mariotti (2005), the authors discuss in 
abstract terms the method by which alliance members 
decide on a proposal, considering a variety of different 
“internal procedures.” The main finding in this paper 
is that procedures requiring unanimous agreement by 
alliance members result in more aggressive bargain-
ing stances than procedures based on majority rule. 
In Manzini and Mariotti (2003), the model is applied 
to the problem of negotiations between an alliance of 
polluting firms and a regulator. Using a unanimity 
procedure, they find that the outcome of negotiations 
is entirely determined by the preferences of the “tough-
est” alliance member.
One advantage of the Manzini-Mariotti framework 
relative to many others in the multilateral bargaining 
literature is that it delivers a unique solution to the 
bargaining problem even when decisionmaking within 
the alliance is governed by majority rule. This advan-
9  More precisely, the relationship between equilibrium offers and those made in the final rounds of the finite-horizon games 
that approximate Rubinstein’s model becomes vanishingly small as the time horizon increases (Fudenberg and Levine).
10  It should be emphasized at this point that in the equilibria of the MB model—and all other complete information bargaining 
models—agreement is always reached in the first round of bargaining so that last-minute equilibrium agreements never arise. 
The distinction between Rubinstein’s and the MB models arises from out-of-equilibrium interactions at the eleventh hour, which, 
in the latter but not the former, are transmitted via backward induction to the beginning of the game. Applied economists are 
generally highly skeptical of arguments that involve long and intricate backward-inductive chains. To some extent, this justifiable 
skepticism may be mitigated when applied to the MB model because, typically, the basic shape of the solution is more or less 
determined after only a few rounds of backward induction (see section 5). This fact may also reassure experimentalists since 
there is overwhelming evidence that experimental subjects seem unable to induct backward much beyond three periods (see, 
for example, Neelin, Sonnenschein, and Speigel; Speigel et al.; Binmore et al.; and Johnson et al.).
11  Proposition 3.7 in Osborne and Rubinstein. The result is also discussed in Sutton.
12  Sutton and Osborne and Rubinstein note that Shaked’s result can easily be extended to n players.
13  Bennett (1991), Bennett (1997), Bennett and Houba, and Bennett and Damme.
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tage, however, has a significant cost. Technically, the 
result is obtained by separating into distinct rounds 
the multilateral bargaining within the alliance and the 
(bilateral) bargaining between the alliance, acting as 
a unit, and the other party. This structure, however, 
limits the applicability of the framework. In many 
bargaining situations, such as the one we study in 
this monograph, the distinction between an alliance 
and “the other side” is far from clear-cut and “alliance” 
members interact with each other within plenary 
negotiating sessions without ever constituting them-
selves as a distinct group with a unitary “voice.”
Cai (2003) also studies bargaining between a 
single “active” player and an (implicit) alliance of 
many “passive” players who exhibit different degrees 
of toughness (see also Cai (2000)). In Cai’s model, 
the active player negotiates with each of the passive 
players in turn in an exogenously specified order. If 
an agreement is reached with a passive player, that 
player leaves the game with a contingent commitment 
that will be honored by the active player. Provided 
that the players’ common discount factor exceeds a 
prespecified value δ – < 1, Cai’s game has one efficient 
Markov equilibrium and multiple inefficient Markov 
equilibria. The source of inefficiency (necessarily) 
is that agreement is not reached in the first round. 
In the inefficient equilibria, the passive players have 
different strategies. In the three-player version of this 
game, the active player proposes to the tougher of the 
two passive players and agreement is not reached. The 
second passive player is now obliged to accept a bad 
deal rather than wait for another round of bargain-
ing. As the discount factor goes to unity, the tougher 
passive and the active players receive essentially 
equal shares and the weaker passive player receives 
a smaller share.
The models discussed so far were all developed 
by economists. Models of multilateral bargaining and 
negotiations have also been developed within other 
disciplines, especially political science, psychology, 
and management science. Of these, perhaps the most 
influential has been the framework that Baron and 
Ferejohn (BF) (1987, 1989a, 1989b) introduced. Their 
framework considers a problem in which n identical 
players must divide up a pie using majority rule. One 
variant of BF is strikingly similar to the MB model yet 
draws quite different conclusions: Players propose 
divisions of the pie in odd-numbered rounds, nature 
chooses one of the proposals at random, and voting 
follows in even-numbered rounds. In the two-round 
version of this model, each proposer keeps slightly 
more than half of the pie and distributes a small por-
tion to enough others to obtain a majority vote. In the 
infinite-horizon version of the game, as usual, virtu-
ally any division can be supported as an equilibrium. 
The two-period outcome, however, is identified as the 
unique outcome that can be supported by “stationary” 
or Markov-perfect strategies. These are strategies that 
can only depend on “current and immediate-future” 
conditions, such as the set of available strategies in 
the current round, the parties that are bidding in the 
next round, etc. Strategies involving punishments for 
past deviations from the equilibrium path are thus 
excluded. Also excluded, however, are strategies that 
exploit impending deadlines since a player’s strategy 
cannot depend on the number of remaining bargain-
ing rounds. Because of this choice of solution concept, 
the BF and MB models have strikingly different proper-
ties in spite of their very similar extensive forms.
The BF model has spawned a very large literature. 
We mention here only a small selection. Eraslan and 
Eraslan and McLennan have shown that a unique 
stationary equilibrium exists for the BF model under 
quite general conditions. Jackson and Moselle extend 
the bargaining space of the BF model to two dimen-
sions, an ideological and a distributive dimension, and 
study the stationary equilibria of this model. Players’ 
preferences are separable across the two dimensions. 
Along the distributive dimension, each bargainer pre-
fers the largest possible share and is indifferent with 
respect to the distribution of the share that he does 
not receive. Along the ideological dimension, each 
player has single-peaked preference as in the standard 
unidimensional voting model. While proposals may 
be linked or decoupled, equilibrium proposals are 
always linked.
Norman focuses on the finite-horizon version of 
the BF game. When all players have identical discount 
rates, he establishes that, when there are at least five 
bargainers (n ≥ 5) who are sufficiently patient, any 
division of the pie in which each player receives a 
positive share can be supported as an equilibrium 
when the time horizon is sufficiently long. The proof 
of this multiplicity result involves an argument quite Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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different from the one used to establish multiplicity 
in an infinite horizon game: It depends critically on 
the fact that proposers are indifferent with respect 
to the compositions of the coalitions that support 
their proposals and so can be modeled as selecting 
coalitions in ways that support the punishment of 
deviations from the equilibrium path. On the other 
hand, when players’ discount rates differ, he shows 
that, except for a measure zero set of discount rate 
vectors, there is a unique vector of subgame-perfect 
equilibrium payoffs for each finite-horizon game when 
n ≥ 5. While Norman’s generic eradication of the mul-
tiplicity problem is potentially encouraging, it exhibits 
the unsatisfactory property that equilibrium outcomes 
fluctuate dramatically with respect to the time horizon 
of the game: Players who have the lowest equilibrium 
payoffs in the T-period game will be the cheapest ones 
to bribe in the first round of the T+1-period game and, 
hence, will be selected by all proposers in that round 
and will have the highest equilibrium payoffs in that 
game. In this sense, this model, while interesting, has 
essentially no predictive power because the outcome 
is so sensitive to perturbations in T. This oscillatory 
property appears to be an unavoidable consequence 
of assuming decisionmaking by majority rule. It is 
precisely to avoid such oscillations that we assume in 
the current application of the MB model that proposals 
must be accepted unanimously.
We complete this review of the bargaining theory 
literature with a brief discussion of some other papers 
developed by noneconomists. In Doron and Sened 
(1995, 2001), the political bargaining process is 
characterized as distinct from economic bargaining 
in several dimensions: It is usually more complex; 
it often involves numerous actors who are endowed 
with unequal skills, leverage, and information; it is 
typically dynamic and tends to yield nonunique out-
comes; the participants are rarely of equal status; they 
often act on behalf of an undefined “public interest” 
or in the name of the uninformed population of vot-
ers and supporters. The resources allocated are a mix 
of tangible and intangible goods, which often cannot 
be ascribed fixed prices or comparable values. Politi-
cal commodities, such as sovereignty, independence, 
equality, or legitimacy, are all unlikely to have a mar-
ket-determined value. They must be provided to the 
public through institutionalized and nonvoluntary 
mechanisms.
Stokman and van Oosten develop an exchange 
model of policy networks that assumes that players 
reach collective decisions after using threats and 
conflict. de Mesquita (1985, 1990) models political 
decision makers as expected utility maximizers. Each 
actor will calculate the utility that he will attain from 
making different offers and from possible offers made 
by the other actors and then will select the route 
that will result in the highest expected utility. The 
bargaining process, then, can be viewed as a search 
by the actors among different alternatives according 
to their perceptions of what the outcome will be in 
each situation. Druckman conducts a meta-analysis 
of the literature on bargaining experiments to identify 
which variables have the strongest effect on compro-
mising behavior and time to resolution in bargaining; 
his findings suggest that the initial distance between 
positions, time pressure, and the negotiator’s orien-
tation are among the strongest determinants of the 
outcome.
The economic literature applying bargaining theory 
and game theory to negotiations over water scarcity 
has grown as such negotiations have become more 
common. One strand of this literature has focused 
on the application of cooperative game theory to 
water negotiations. Dinar, Ratner, and Yaron provide 
an extensive survey of work in this area and Par-
rachino, Dinar, and Patrone summarize more recent 
developments. Dinar et al. compare the cooperative 
approach to a negotiated approach utilizing interac-
tions between analysts and stakeholders for allocating 
water in the Kat Basin in South Africa. They find that 
results are similar and that cooperative game theoretic 
modeling may complement an interactive stakeholder 
negotiation approach.
Carraro, Marchiori, and Sgobbi extensively exam-
ine applications of negotiation theory to problems 
involving water management. After surveying the 
literature on standard theoretical models and noting 
that the predictions of these models are often not real-
ized in real negotiation processes, attention is turned 
to the relatively new field of research on negotiation 
support system (NSS) tools. These tools, developed by 
computer scientists, political scientists, and engineers Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
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to assist negotiators, are essentially computer models 
that support the negotiation process by performing 
constrained optimization with multiple objectives and 
multiple issues. The survey reports on a number of 
studies that address topics closely related to the one 
analyzed in this monograph. Becu et al. developed a 
multi-agent system to facilitate water management in 
Thailand. The model includes a biophysical module 
and a social module and is designed to simulate dif-
ferent water management scenarios. Barreteau et al. 
developed an agent-based simulation tool to support 
negotiations over water allocation among farmers in 
the Drome Valley in France. Computer models assess 
the collective consequences of alternative water allo-
cation scenarios under different assumptions about 
water availability. The results are presented to stake-
holders in the negotiations and the issue space is 
modified according to their reactions. Other support 
system tools are designed to be used interactively. For 
example, Thiesse, Loucks, and Stedinger created the 
Interactive Computer Assisted Negotiation Support 
System to provide real-time assistance to parties on all 
sides of the negotiating process, facilitating the selec-
tion of a mutually beneficial agreement. Negotiators 
are presented with different alternatives that emerge 
from their preferences on the issue space and the 
physical constraints. The effectiveness of this tool was 
tested in controlled experiments with two parties and 
up to seven issues. A limitation of the approach is that 
equity issues cannot be incorporated; also, the system 
relies heavily on truthful revelation by participants 
about their rankings over alternatives.Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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W
e will apply the model introduced in section 
2 to a specific negotiation in southern France 
over water use, water storage capacity, and user 
prices. Our analysis is based on extensive background 
research regarding the hydrology, agriculture, and 
political economy of the upstream part of the Adour 
River Basin in southwestern France, from its origin in 
the Pyrenees to its junction with the Midouze River.
See Gleyses and Morardet, Faysse, Faysse and 
Morardet, Cemagref, Thoyer et al. (2004), Thoyer 
et al. (2001), and Goodhue et al. (forthcoming) for 
additional information regarding institutions and 
extensive discussions of technical, agricultural, and 
hydrological parameters; stakeholder groups; and 
preferences.
4.1. Background
Under the national French water law passed in 1992, 
water is a national resource and stakeholders are as-
signed responsibility for designing the regulations 
governing its use, subject to the overall guideline that 
these regulations will balance the needs of water users 
against environmental considerations. The national 
law requires that specific water development plans be 
formulated for each hydrological basin and that the 
regulations to implement these plans be designed and 
enforced at the catchment level. The Adour Basin is 
one such catchment area. At this more localized level, 
regulations must be negotiated among all stakeholders 
under conditions defined by the relevant government 
authorities.
Use of river water from the Adour Basin for irriga-
tion has increased substantially over the past twenty 
years and is now its most important use by volume, 
accounting for roughly two-thirds of total water use. 
Agriculture uses water primarily in the dry summer 
months of July and August when the river flow is low. 
Corn is the most important irrigated agricultural crop, 
followed by soybeans. Increased irrigation has led to a 
water shortage in the basin equal to roughly a fifth of 
annual agricultural use. Several environmental groups 
have been concerned over the effect of irrigation-
induced reductions in river flows on the welfare of 
aquatic life. One proposed solution to these concerns 
has been to construct one or more dams that would 
capture water during the wet months and then release 
it in July and August. Other environmental groups 
have opposed this proposal because of the expected 
impact of dam construction on the natural landscape. 
To resolve the issue, a negotiation has been initiated, 
to be conducted according to a process mandated by 
the national government.
The water development plan for the Adour Basin 
required stakeholders to consider whether or not 
to build one or more dams and how the operating 
costs of these dams would be allocated among users. 
The variables to be negotiated included river flow 
requirements (and, hence, irrigation quotas) and 
quota prices. Specifically, Adour Basin stakeholders 
were charged with determining the amount of water 
that should be allocated to irrigation, how this water 
should be allocated among agricultural users, and 
the price that users should pay for this water. The 
parties at the negotiating table included elected rep-
resentatives of agricultural producers; environmental 
interests; a group representing the interests of all 
nonagricultural water users in the basin, including 
urban and recreational users downstream from our 
study area; representatives of agricultural and environ-
mental agencies from local and central governments; 
representatives of elected local governments; and the 
manager of the semipublic Adour Basin water author-
ity that maintains infrastructure, delivers water, and 
monitors river flow.
4.2. model
Applying the MB framework reviewed in section 2, 
we developed a stylized computer simulation model 
of the negotiation problem described in section 4.1, 
the results of which are presented in section 5. In this 
section we describe the components of the simulation 
model. Many of the details, suppressed here to save 
space, are available elsewhere (see Goodhue et al. 
(1999) and Thoyer et al. (2001)).
4. Adour River NegotiationsGiannini Foundation Monograph 47
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Structure of the Problem
The Adour Basin consists of three subbasins (see 
Figure 2) separated by flow measurement points. 
The label inside each circle indicates the number of 
hectares (in thousands) under irrigation in each sub-
basin. We label these by U, M, and D for “upstream,” 
“midstream,” and “downstream,” respectively. The 
upstream subbasin is above Estirac. The midstream 
subbasin is below Estirac and above Aire sur Adour. 
The downstream subbasin is below Aire sur Adour 
and above Audon where the Midouze joins the 
Adour. As Figure 2 indicates, the sizes of the three 
subbasins differ substantially. In particular, the 
upper subbasin is larger than the other two. We as-
sume that, corresponding to each subbasin, there is 
a single representative farmer, labeled Fu, Fm, and Fd, 
respectively. The pattern of agricultural activity differs 
across subbasins.
Farmers in each subbasin negotiate over the quota 
allocation they will receive. The negotiated quota allo-
cation determines the maximum amount of water that 
a farmer is entitled to use per eligible hectare farmed.14 
The quota does not depend on technical parameters 
such as the crops a farmer intends to grow or the on-
farm technical efficiency of water use. Quotas may, 
however, vary by subbasin because farmers’ needs 
and the externalities resulting from water use are 
significantly different across subbasins.
Farmers are required to pay a fixed unit price for 
each quota unit at the time it is allocated. After-tax 
operating revenue from quota sales—the inner product 
of prices and the quota allocation—accrues to the water 
manager to offset his operating costs.15 The level of 
quota sales is related to the minimum level of quota 
prices by the administrative budget constraint (ABC). 
The ABC requires that after-tax operating revenues 
from water management cover operating costs, which 
are an affine function of aggregate dam capacity.
Quota sales are limited by hydrology constraints that 
specify minimum residual flows of water downstream 
of each subbasin. The residual flow at a measurement 
point is calculated as the total volume of water that 
flows into the subbasin immediately above the point, 
including releases from existing and proposed new 
upstream dams, minus the total volume of water used 
by farmers within that subbasin. In the absence of 
dams, these flows would be determined by the natu-
ral flows of water after deducting quotas allocated to 
farmers. The Adour-Garonne Water Development Plan 
proposed that the natural flows should be supple-
mented by building as many as three dams, provided 
stakeholders could negotiate an agreement regard-
ing the size of each dam, subject to capacity limits 
14  In practice, the actual water used during the two-month period modeled is between 64 percent and 70 percent of the quota al-
location. Generally, water is scarce enough that farmers use their entire purchased allocation over the entire growing season.
15  Note that the manager’s revenue depends on the quota allocation, not on the amount of water actually applied by farmers. 
Even if a farmer uses less than his quota allocation, he must pay for his entire allocation.
Figure 2. A Schematic of the Adour Basin
Source:  Thoyer et al. (2001)
Downstream basin (farmed by farmer Fd)
Aire sur Adour (midstream hydrology constraint monitored)
Midstream basin (farmed by farmer Fm)
Estirac (upstream hydrology constraint monitored)
Upstream basin (farmed by farmer Fu)
Audon   
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determined by technical considerations (See Figure 
2 for proposed dam locations and the measurement 
points at which flows are monitored.16). The dams, 
if constructed, would have different implications for 
water flows: As Figure 2 indicates, dam #2 would 
increase flows at the measurement point downstream 
of subbasin D only, while dams #1 and #3 would each 
increase flows at all three measurement points. Farm-
ers would be required to finance the operating costs of 
the dams but not the capital costs. Local government 
entities would share responsibility for the capital costs 
with the national agricultural and environmental 
ministries (Faysse and Morardet).
Dam construction is controversial. The advantages 
are that new dams would increase the residual flows 
of water. Such residual flow increases would benefit 
users who are downstream of the subbasins, promote 
aquatic life, and relax the hydrological constraints on 
farmers. The disadvantages are that dams are costly 
and degrade the quality of the rural landscape.17
We now explain the hydrology constraints in more 
detail. For each subbasin, the residual flow of water 
cannot fall short of a minimum level called the flow 
objective, which was set in the Adour-Garonne Water 
Development Plan (SDAGE) in order to protect aquatic 
life in the river (Faysse and Morardet). Two of the 
three classes of variables being negotiated will directly 
affect the hydrology constraints: dam capacities, which 
affect water inflows, and quotas, which determine 
water outflows. The other class of variables—quota 
prices—interact with hydrology constraints through 
the administrative budget constraint. When dam 
capacities increase, administrative operating costs 
increase also. Holding quota levels constant, quota 
prices must rise in order to keep the administrator’s 
budget constraint in balance.
The Bargaining Space
There are three classes of negotiated variables: prices, 
quotas, and dam capacities. There are three proposed 
dams and three price-quota pairs, one for each sub-
basin. In the bargaining games we simulate, we 
distinguish between three bargaining regimes identi-
fied as “Common Prices, Common Quotas” (CPCQ), 
“Common Prices, Individual Quotas” (CPIQ), and 
“Individual Prices, Common Quotas” (IPCQ). The 
regimes differ in the flexibility they provide a rep-
resentative from one subbasin to differentiate that 
subbasin’s treatment under the bargaining outcome 
from the treatment that the other subbasins receive. 
In regime CPCQ the bargaining space is restricted 
so that a common price and a common quota apply 
to all subbasins. In regime CPIQ the price remains 
common but bargainers are allowed to specify distinct 
quota levels for each subbasin. In regime IPCQ prices 
are common and quotas are distinct. In both CPIQ 
and IPCQ we impose (and, in section 5.3, vary) a 
heterogeneity bound on the degree to which subbasin-
specific negotiated variables can be differentiated from 
each other.18 In the absence of such a bound, each sub-
basin representative would attempt to acquire for his 
own subbasin the highest possible quota at the lowest 
possible price, offloading the entire scarcity (in CPIQ) 
or cost (in IPCQ) burden onto the other subbasins to 
the maximum extent allowed by their participation 
constraints. By varying these bounds continuously, 
we can conduct comparative statics experiments on 
the impact of restricting players’ flexibility within the 
bargaining space.
Analyzing these three distinct regimes enables us 
to explore the effect on bargaining performance of 
different institutional specifications of the bargaining 
space. In particular, we test the natural conjecture that, 
if farmers are limited by institutional constraints on 
the extent to which they can pursue their own interests 
at the expense of their “coalition partners,” then their 
performance as a group will be enhanced.
Each regime is examined under both normal and 
drought conditions. Historically, in eight out of ten 
years, rainfall in the Adour Basin has been sufficient to 
provide farmers with adequate water without violating 
16  Dam #1’s maximum capacity is one-quarter the maximum capacity of either of the other two dams.
17  In general, it is by no means obvious that dams would benefit downstream aquatic life. In this monograph we model the 
benefits reported by stakeholders (Faysse). We are indebted to an anonymous referee for emphasizing this point.
18  Specifically, in regime CPIQ (IPCQ), we impose a bound on the variance of the three quotas (prices) announced in a given 
proposal.Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
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the hydrology constraints. We refer to conditions in 
these years as “normal” and calibrate our model so 
that the hydrology constraints are not binding in 
equilibrium under normal conditions (although they 
may bind off the equilibrium path). By contrast, our 
calibration of “drought conditions” ensures that at 
least one of the hydrology constraints binds in equi-
librium. These two scenarios represent alternative 
operating assumptions on which negotiations might 
be based: Rational stakeholders would adopt quota 
proposals consistent with binding flow constraints if 
and only if they collectively acknowledged the possi-
bility of drought conditions.19 As will hereafter become 
apparent, the negotiating environment—and, hence, 
the comparative statics properties of our model—will 
be quite sensitive to this critical assumption.
Bargaining Participants  
and Their Payoff Functions
There are seven “players,” each one representing either 
a single stakeholder or a composite of stakeholders. 
Because the distribution of political power among 
these stakeholders is not a primary consideration in 
this study, we specify exogenously that each player 
in our benchmark model has the same access prob-
ability. (This assumption is standard in the literature, 
cf. Baron and Ferejohn (1987) and the large literature 
that this paper spawned.)
Each player has a strictly concave utility (or payoff) 
function defined on the space of bargaining propos-
als. In multilateral, multi-issue bargaining contexts 
such as ours, weak concavity would be a more natural 
assumption since many dimensions of the bargaining 
space, though of critical importance to some negotia-
tors, will have no impact at all on others. However, 
strict concavity is required in the MB model if we are 
to obtain unique solutions and, hence, meaningful 
comparative statics. The problem with weak concavity 
is that decisions that have a significant impact on one 
party may be determined by an arbitrary resolution of 
indifference by another.20 Indeed, in a computational 
model such as ours, the numerical solution algorithm 
may resolve indifference in a significantly different way 
in response to an insignificant change in parameter 
specifications, generating a comparative statics effect 
that appears to be dramatic but is in fact completely 
artificial.
When we impose strict concavity on a problem 
involving the allocation of a burden (or benefit) among 
multiple parties, we encounter two distinct kinds of 
problems. The first is a general one, common to all 
multi-issue problems: Typically, not every negotiator 
necessarily cares about each one of the variables being 
negotiated. The second is special to allocation prob-
lems: When the burden is being shared among some 
or all of the negotiating parties, the most parsimonious 
assumptions are (1) an individual who bears a portion 
of the burden cares about the size of his share but is 
indifferent between alternative distributions of the 
remaining share, and (2) for an individual who bears 
none of the burden, the aggregate size of the burden 
may matter but how the burden is allocated is of no 
consequence.
It is relatively easy to resolve the first, general 
problem: We model each agent as having nondegen-
erate preferences over all “aggregate” variables in the 
bargaining space. But, to sharpen our analysis, we 
weight variables that are less important for that agent 
by negligibly small coefficients. For example, each 
farmer in our model is primarily concerned about the 
price and quota he negotiates for himself but also has 
a negligible preference for larger over smaller dams. To 
resolve the second, special problem, we assume, with-
out particularly strong foundations, that negotiators 
have an extremely mild “second-order” preference for 
19  In the actual negotiation procedure on which this study was based, no provision was made for assigning quotas conditional 
on rainfall levels. As a result, the agreed-upon total consumptive use would result, under drought conditions, in unsustainable 
levels of water usage, reducing residual flows to below government-defined crisis flow levels. In such an event, the water manager 
would be authorized to halt all irrigation. This rigidity in the negotiating procedure has an obvious and unfortunate consequence: 
If the assumptions on which farmers base their negotiating positions are too conservative, they will deprive themselves of avail-
able water under normal conditions; if the assumptions are not conservative enough, farmers risk the possibility of catastrophic 
shutdowns under drought conditions. In turn, this rigidity contributed to the deadlocking of the negotiations.
20  A precisely analogous problem is endemic in extensive-form game theory though it arises in a quite different context: Decisions 
made by one agent at “off-the-equilibrium-path” decision nodes are of no consequence to that agent but will, in general, have a 
significant impact on the set of opportunities available to other agents.Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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“equity;” that is, we assume that each agent obtains a 
vanishingly small increment in utility from a symmet-
ric allocation of a given residual burden (i.e., excluding 
his own share) relative to an asymmetric allocation of 
the same residual. To implement this second idea, we 
add to each player’s “real” or first-order utility function 
a second, almost flat function that is strictly concave 
in the variables being allocated—prices and quotas. 
The net result of our adaptations is that each agent’s 
utility function will have indifference surfaces with 
significant curvature along the dimensions that really 
matter to that agent and barely perceptible curvature 
along the dimensions that do not.21 As the discus-
sions of our results that follow will demonstrate, these 
second-order preferences for equity affect none of our 
results in a significant way.
We now introduce our seven agents and their 
preferences.22
(1) Three representative farmers, one from each 
subbasin, labeled Fu, Fm, and Fd. The term Fi 
denotes the generic farmer. Fi’s objective is to 
maximize profits from farming in the ith sub-
basin. Profits increase with quota levels and 
decrease with quota prices. Because of differ-
ences in agricultural patterns at the subbasin 
level, farmers differ in their willingness to pay 
for quotas. For a given quota, Fm’s willingness 
is greatest, then Fu’s, and then Fd’s. To ensure 
that farmers’ preferences depend to some 
degree on all the variables being negotiated, we 
assume that farmers have a slight preference 
for larger rather than smaller dams but that 
this preference is very weak. (Note that, while 
dam capacities are not significant direct con-
tributors to farmers’ utilities, they do have an 
important, indirect effect through the model’s 
constraint structure.)
     Formally, Fi’s first-order utility is translog 
in his quota price, pi, and quota level, qi:
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  ln((1 + pi)(1 + qi))).
   The vector ai ∈  6 is estimated from linear 
programming simulations based on microeco-
nomic farm models (Gleyses and Morardet); 
the vector d = (dj)3
j=1 where dj is the capacity 
of the jth dam expressed as a fraction of its 
maximum feasible capacity. The b j
i
  s are only 
negligibly larger than zero. It should be noted 
that the arguments of Fi’s utility are not the 
regular inputs and output of an agricultural 
production function. Rather, once quotas 
have been negotiated, the maximum quota 
level available to Fi, qi, will be a constraint on 
production. Moreover, since Fi must pay for 
the quota level he has agreed to regardless of 
his actual production level, he will view piqi as 
a sunk cost.
(2) An environmentalist (Ev). This stakeholder, a 
composite of diverse environmental interests, 
21  This idea is very similar in spirit to the notion of “trembling-hand perfection” introduced in Selten (1975). The difference is 
that, while Selten represented second-order preferences by sequences of arbitrarily small trembles, we cannot work with infini-
tesimals; our second-order preferences make a small but finite contribution to agents’ overall preferences.
22  To each agent’s u term defined below, we add his corresponding v term, representing the agent’s second-order preferences for 
equitable distributions of burdens and benefits. The γs are very small in absolute value, with signs that match agents’ preferences 
for the corresponding first-order variables, e.g., farmers prefer higher quotas and lower prices, both for themselves and for other 
farmers, while negotiators on the “other side” have the reverse preferences.
The effect of adding the vs to the us is that, whenever a decision “really matters” to an agent, the choice that the agent makes will 
be determined, effectively, by that agent’s u and not by his v. For example, if the participation constraints (see section 2) of farm-
ers Fm and Fd are binding when farmer Fu makes a decision, then how Fu allocates benefits and costs between Fm and Fd will be 
determined (except for a very small error term) by the lagrangians on those constraints. When neither participation constraint 
is binding, however, the effects of farmer Fu’s choice on Fm and Fd will be determined by Fu’s v function.Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
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is primarily concerned about the quality of 
the rural landscape and secondarily about 
maintaining adequate river flow rates. Since 
the rural landscape is negatively impacted by 
dam construction, Ev’s constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) utility function is decreas-
ing in the vector d and increasing in the vector 
r: dj is the capacity of the jth dam expressed 
as a fraction of its maximum feasible capac-
ity; ri is the residual flow of water in the ith 
subbasin, again expressed as a fraction of the 
maximum feasible residual flow.23 (Note that 
players do not explicitly propose values for the 
residual flow vector, r; rather, each proposal 
implies a unique value for r that increases with 
proposed dam capacities and decreases with 
proposed quotas.) Clearly, Ev’s two goals can 
be reconciled only by reducing the water used 
by farmers.
     In our specification of nonfarmers’ utilities, 
the capacities of dams #1 and #2 are viewed 
as virtually perfect substitutes for one another 
and imperfect substitutes for the capacity of 
dam #3. (The qualifier “virtually” is required 
to ensure strict rather than weak preference 
concavity.) Dam #3 is treated specially because 
its construction would have a particularly sig-
nificant negative impact on the landscape. It is 
located in the mountains in a very scenic valley. 
Also residual flows in subbasins U and M are 
virtually perfect substitutes for one another 
and imperfect substitutes for residual flows 
below subbasin D. Flows below subbasin D are 
treated specially because they are considered 
particularly important for maintaining aquatic 
life and recreational activities.
     We assume that Ev has a very weak pref-
erence for higher rather than lower levels of 
total revenue from quota sales, ∑
3
i=1piqi; local 
authorities tax these sales at a proportional 
rate and utilize the tax receipts for maintaining 
the river, and Ev obtains some utility from these 
tax-financed government services. In symbols, 
let φ(x) and ϕ(x) denote, respectively, strictly 
concave and strictly convex functions that are 















  xEv (d, r) = ( φ(rU, rM), rD, (2 − ϕ(d1, d2)),
  (1 − d3), ∑
3
i=1piqi), and
  aEv ∈  5
++
   with a5
Ev <<  a1
Ev, a2
Ev <<  a3
Ev, a4
Ev and a5
Ev ≈ 0. 
Note that increases in proposed dam capaci-
ties affect utility positively through the first 
two arguments of uEv and negatively through 
the third and fourth. When a dam is small, 
its net effect on uEv is positive, but there may 
exist a critical size beyond which its net effect 
becomes negative.
     Lacking quantitative data from which to 
estimate Ev’s preferences, we assign values 
to the weights aEv that reflect in a qualitative 
way the relative importance that Ev assigns to 
different concerns as elicited from stakeholder 
interviews (Faysse). We proceed in the same 
way for the remaining three players hereafter 
described.
(3) A downstream user (Ds). There are stakeholders 
in the Adour Basin who are primarily con-
cerned with minimizing demands on water 
flows in the three subbasins. These include 
downstream water users, recreational users 
of the river, and environmentalists concerned 
with downstream aquatic wildlife. We combine 
these stakeholders into a composite “down-
stream user,” Ds. While Ds’s utility has the same 
functional form as Ev’s, he ranks water flows as 
significantly more important than preserving 
the rural landscape. (Recall that Ev, by contrast, 
was significantly more concerned about the 
rural landscape.) Specifically, we assume that 
a1
Ds, a2
Ds >>  a3
Ds, a4
Ds >>  a5
Ds with a5
Ds ≈ 0. Since Ds 
has a higher “willingness to pay” for residual 
flows in terms of larger dams, the net effect of 
a unit increase in dam capacity for uDs is either 
more positive or less negative than for uEv.
23  This maximum is attained when dams are built to their maximum capacity and farmers use no water.Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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(4) A manager (Mg). Mg administers the distri-
bution of water in the district. For statutory 
reasons, he is equally concerned with avoiding 
budget deficits and budget surpluses. Further, 
he derives utility from increasing the scope 
of the water system he administers. That is, 
he prefers a larger operation and, therefore, 
higher dam capacities. Mg’s CES utility is 





 (  xk
Mg





   where aMg ∈  2
+, x1
Mg = ϕ(d) and x2
Mg decreases 
in the distance between the manager’s realized 
and his target return on operations. In addi-
tion to his role as a player, Mg impacts the 
bargaining through the administrative budget 
constraint (see section 4.2).
(5) The taxpayer (Tp). The taxpayer in our model 
represents interests that are primarily nonlocal 
and nonagricultural.24 This player’s goals are 
to minimize the burden on French taxpayers 
by limiting expenditures on local dams and 
to maximize benefits to nonfarm users by 
increasing residual flows. Like Ev and Ds, Tp 
has a very weak positive preference for higher 
rather than lower local tax revenues. Formally, 
Tp’s CES utility is 










   with the following interpretation of symbols: 
  xTp (r, c) = (φ (rU, rM) rD, (3 − ϕ(c)), ∑
3
i=1piqi)
   where cj is the construction cost of the jth 
dam expressed as a fraction of the cost 
of constructing the dam to its maximum 
admissible  capacity and aTp ∈  4
++  with 
a4
Tp < <   a1
Tp, a2
Tp < <   a3
Tp, and a4
Tp ≈ 0.
Under this specification, all players have nondegen-
erate preferences over all classes of variables, with the 
qualifications that farmers care only about the quotas 
that affect their own subbasins and nonfarm players 
care only about the inner product of quota prices and 
quantities. With the addition of second-order prefer-
ences (footnote 22) to these first-order preferences, 
each player’s preferences are strictly concave in all 
variables.
The preference profile specified here gives rise to 
a clear-cut conflict between farmers on the one hand 
and Ev, Ds, and Tp on the other. (For this reason, we 
sometimes refer to the latter group of three players as 
the antifarmer group.) Farmers prefer higher quotas 
and, when the hydrology constraints are binding, pre-
fer greater dam capacity to less. Ev, Ds, and Tp prefer 
lower quotas because quotas and residual flows are 
negatively related and prefer less dam capacity either 
to preserve the rural landscape or to lower the tax 
burden. The relationship between the manager and 
the farmers is more complex. Like the farmers, the 
manager prefers higher quotas and more dam capacity 
but, in contrast to the farmers, he also prefers higher 
prices.
Projecting Preferences onto Price-Quota Space
Because the dimensionality of our bargaining space is 
so large ( 7), it is difficult to obtain much intuition by 
studying players’ full-dimensional proposals directly. 
Fortunately, one can gain a great deal of intuition for 
the comparative statics results discussed in section 
5 by projecting players’ preferences onto price-quota 
space. (This simplification does, however, obscure 
some interesting subtleties.) The projection is im-
mediate for farmers, at least in regime CPCQ, and 
quite simple for Tp and Mg. For Ds and Ev, however, it 
is obtained indirectly through the constraint system 
since these players derive first-order utility from re-
sidual flows and landscape quality, caring barely at 
all about prices.
In order to understand how Ds and Ev’s prefer-
ences are projected, consider regime CPCQ and 
assume that the ABC is binding.25 Letting i denote 
either Ds or Ev, player i’s concerns can be mapped 
into preferences over prices and quotas as follows. 
Starting from a given utility level u –
i, a unit increase in 
the common quota reduces residual flows; hence, i’s 
utility declines and the only variables on the bargain-
ing table that can perhaps increase it back to u –
i are 
24  In actual negotiations, these interests might be represented by a bureaucrat from Paris charged with ensuring that the nego-
tiation process is not captured by either farmers or by local political interests.
25  As noted in section 4.2, the ABC is almost always binding when farmers make proposals.Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
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dam capacities. (Recall that, holding quotas constant, 
if the initial capacity of dams is sufficiently small, the 
net effect of dam capacity increases on ui is positive.) 
Now, consider a unit increase in quotas. An increase 
in dam capacity that exactly offsets the resulting loss 
in residual flows would leave i’s utility below its ini-
tial level, u –
i, since i dislikes dams. So dams must be 
increased by more than this level, to the point that the 
resulting net increase in residual flows is sufficient to 
compensate i for his utility loss due to larger dams. 
Since administrative operating costs increase with 
dam capacity and the ABC is binding, larger dams 
require higher quota prices. Thus, the ABC together 
with the technological relationships between quotas, 
dams, and residual flows induce utility levels for i in 
price-quota space, which decrease with quotas and, 
provided that the derivative of ui with respect to some 
dam capacity is positive, increase with prices (that is, i’s 
indifference curves in price-quota space are positively 
sloped). If, however, dam sizes reach levels such that 
i’s utility declines with any further increase in their 
sizes, then farmers cannot “purchase” from i any fur-
ther increase in quota levels at any price.
The shape of i’s induced preferences in price-quota 
space depends on his relative preference for residual 
flows and rural landscape. It follows from our earlier 
comparison of Ds and Ev that a unit increase in quotas 
hurts Ds less than Ev while, holding quotas constant, 
a unit increase in dam capacity benefits Ds more. 
Therefore, the range of dam sizes for which Ev’s indif-
ference curves in price-quota space will be positively 
sloped is smaller than the range for Ds and they will 
be more steeply sloped whenever they are positive. To 
summarize the preceding discussion, while there is 
no economic marketplace in which farmers can “buy” 
quotas from either Ds or Ev, there is, in effect, a political 
marketplace in which quotas can be “purchased” 
from either of these “suppliers” by increasing dam 
size (and residual flows) and a range of dam sizes 
for which the “political supply schedule” for quotas 
is upward sloping. Having made this distinction, we 
can now proceed as if farmers were buyers of quotas 
and nonfarmers were sellers.
The slope of the political supply schedule may 
become considerably steeper when hydrology con-
straints are binding, which in drought conditions 
is usually the case. For example, in section 5.2 we 
discuss in some detail the predicament facing farm-
ers in regime IPCQ under drought conditions: (a) 
at the proposed quota and dam levels, the residual 
flow below either subbasin M or subbasin U is at its 
minimal admissible level; (b) player Ds’s participation 
constraint is binding; (c) dams #1 and #3 are so large 
that Ds’s utility declines with a further increase in 
either; (d) an increase in dam #2 increases Ds’s util-
ity. In this situation the only way a farmer can induce 
Ds to agree to “supply” still more quotas is to offer to 
expand the size of dam #2. However, an increase in 
the common quota decreases residual flows below 
each of the subbasins while the expansion in dam #2 
increases only the flow below subbasin D (see Figure 
2). Consequently, to restore the flows below the other 
subbasins to their minimal admissible levels, either 
dam #1 or dam #3 must be increased as well. But by 
(c), these secondary increases negatively impact Ds’s 
utility so that dam #2 must be increased still further 
to compensate him. That is, because of the hydrology 
constraints, a unit increase in quotas requires three 
“rounds” of dam increases rather than the single one 
that would be required under normal conditions. 
Because each additional increase in dam size raises 
operating costs and part of each increase in dam capac-
ity must be “bought” by devoting part of the capacity 
increase to increasing residual flows, three rounds 
of quota price increases are required as well. In this 
way, the hydrology constraints steepen the slope of 
the political supply schedule facing farmers.Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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n this section the institutional setting described 
in section 4 provides a context within which we 
explore a number of questions relating to bargaining 
power. To obtain the results reported in this section, 
we solved our computer simulation model for a variety 
of benchmark specifications and then successively 
increased one parameter (e.g., some player’s access 
probability) and re-solved the model to obtain numeri-
cal comparative statics properties. We summarize the 
results of three simulation experiments, each consist-
ing of a large number of individual simulations. Our 
primary objective in this monograph is to provide in-
tuitions for our key findings. Accordingly, we suppress 
all but essential details of our numerical results and 
focus almost exclusively on the effect of perturbing 
certain parameters on the final rounds of bargaining. 
(Many of these suppressed details are documented in 
the papers cited in section 4.2.) In section 5.1 we in-
troduce our method of analysis with a stripped-down 
model in which only three players participate. In sec-
tion 5.2 we compare the performance of the farmer 
coalition when farmers participate independently in 
the bargaining process versus when the coalition is 
represented by a spokesman charged with maximizing 
the joint interests of all farmers. Finally, in section 5.3 
we consider how the specification of the bargaining 
space affects player utilities. In particular, we examine 
whether farmers’ bargaining power is increased if the 
maximum permissible degree of heterogeneity across 
water prices or quotas is restricted.
5.1. Shifting Access: An heuristic Example
To introduce our method of analysis, we begin with 
a simple example. The example serves an heuristic 
purpose but also makes a substantive point. As an in-
structive device, the example illustrates in a simplified 
context how comparative statics exercises are con-
ducted and analyzed in this monograph. In particular, 
it illustrates the role that backward induction plays in 
the MB model and demonstrates how effects in the last 
rounds of the game “build on each other,” creating a 
“snowball effect” that becomes magnified as we move 
backwards through the game tree. The substantive 
contribution is to highlight a striking characteristic 
of the Rausser-Simon model that distinguishes it 
from axiomatic models of bargaining, such as the 
Nash bargaining model, and strategic models, such 
as Rubinstein’s, that implement the “Nash program” 
(Osborne and Rubinstein). In all of those models, 
there is a monotone, increasing relationship between 
a player’s equilibrium payoffs and his traditional, 
exogenously specified measures of bargaining power: 
his bargaining weight and his “default payoff,” i.e., the 
payoff he receives if the bargaining phase ends without 
an agreement being reached. In the MB model there 
are additional, less transparent sources of bargaining 
advantage so that the relationship between payoffs 
and traditional measures of power is more delicate. 
In particular, the relationship between payoffs and 
power as traditionally measured need no longer be 
monotone.
The example in this section compares the equi-
libria of two games that are identical except for the 
players’ access probabilities. In both games, farmers 
as a group have the same aggregate access but in the 
second, the distribution among them is shifted in favor 
of a farmer who has a strategic advantage relative to 
the others arising from his “location” in preference 
space. To reduce the problem to its barest essentials, 
we strip down our model by excluding four of our 
seven players from the bargaining process, leaving 
only Fu, Fm, and Ds. Assume also that there is only 
one dam (#1) for which size is being negotiated. The 
comparative statics experiment we consider is a shift 
in access from Fu to Fm in the CPCQ regime.26 (Recall 
that access probabilities were introduced in section 2 
and that regime CPCQ is defined by the condition that 
prices and quotas must be equal across subbasins.) To 
further simplify the exposition, we project all players’ 
5. COmpARATIvE STATICS ANALySIS
26  Note that we use the word “shift” for expositional convenience: We are not suggesting that the access probability vector is a 
variable over which farmers have some control. The exercise considered here is a routine comparative statics one in which one 
exogenous parameter of the model—the distribution of power between farmers—is varied.Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
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preferences onto price-quota space in the manner 
described in section 4.2. Intuitively, one would expect 
that a shift in access from Fu to Fm would increase Fm’s 
utility while decreasing Fu’s. In fact, the outcome is 
that both Fm and Fu benefit from the shift! The key to 
the argument is that Fm’s participation in the negotia-
tions generates, in effect, a positive externality for Fu. 
When Fm gains access at the expense of Fu, there are 
multiple effects on Fu’s payoff in all but the last round 
of bargaining. In all rounds of bargaining, there is a 
“direct” effect, which reduces it. In round T-1 there is 
an “indirect” effect—the externality—that increases it. 
In rounds T-2 and earlier, there are multiple indirect 
effects, which further increase Fu’s payoff. Under cer-
tain conditions, the indirect effects dominate, resulting 
in an inverse relationship between Fu’s equilibrium 
payoff and his access probability.
Consider the impact of an access shift from Fu to Fm 
in the final round of bargaining. In this round, players’ 
proposals depend only on default payoffs and, hence, 
are independent of access probabilities. Consequently, 
the only impact of the change in access is what we call 
the direct one: Fu strictly prefers his own proposal to 
Fm’s and the latter is now more heavily weighted so 
that Fu’s expected utility, conditional on reaching the 
final round, is negatively impacted.
Matters become more complex as we move back-
ward through the game tree. We explain the argument 
underlying the result with the aid of Figures 3 and 4, 
which represent, respectively, rounds T-1 and T-2 of 
the bargaining in a T-round game. In each figure the 
shaded area highlights the region of the bargaining 
space that is relevant for that round; curves outside the 
shaded region are relevant for the round that follows. 
We begin with Figure 3. The left panel represents the 
bargaining for our benchmark vector of access prob-
abilities. The three solid thick curves (labeled u0
r ) 
outside the shaded region represent the three players’ 
participation constraints in the round T of bargaining, 
i.e., any price-quota pair on u0
r  yields player r the same 
payoff as the disagreement outcome. Note that Fm’s 
constraint is steeper than Fu’s, reflecting Fm’s higher 
willingness to pay for the marginal quota (for the 
reason explained in section 4.2). The players’ T-round 
proposals are indicated by xr
T  . The large dot in the 
center of the left panel denotes the weighted average, 
ExT, of these proposals where the weights are the play-
ers’ access probabilities. The three solid thin curves 
(labeled Eur
T  ) in the left panel represent participation 
constraints in round T-1, i.e., any price-quota pair on 
Eur
T    yields player r the same payoff as r’s expected 
payoff from the lottery in round T generated by the xr
T  s. 
Note in particular that, while the relative locations of 
u0
Fm and u0
Fu are determined by the exogenously speci-
fied disagreement payoffs, the locations of curves EuFm
T  
and EuFu
T  , relative to point ExT, depend on agents’ risk 
aversion. The more risk averse agent r is, the greater 
will be the minimum distance between ExT and the 
curve Eur
T  . Unless Fm is significantly more risk averse 
than Fu, Fm’s participation constraint in round T-1 
Figure 3. Access Shift Tightens Fm’s Participation Constraint in Round T-1
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must lie, as it does in the figure, to the southeast of 
Fu’s in the region of the figure to the south of ExT. The 
level sets of Ds’s payoff function are relatively steep; 
in fact, they are almost vertical. (This means that, if 
the size of dam #1 is increased by one unit, the result-
ing increment in water flows when holding quotas 
constant raises Ds’s utility by an amount only barely 
greater than the amount by which Ds’s utility declines 
because dams despoil the landscape. The gap between 
these two amounts is the “surplus utility” generated 
by the dam increase, which can be “soaked up” by an 
increase in quota allocation, leaving Ds indifferent. In 
this instance the surplus amount is tiny.) Now, since 
Fm’s level sets are steeper than Fu’s, Fm’s participation 
constraint must be binding on Ds while Fu’s must be 
slack. It follows that Ds’s proposal in round T-1 will be 
independent of the precise location of Fu’s participa-
tion constraint in round T (EuFu
T  ) but will be affected 
by any small change in the location of Fm’s (EuFm
T  ).
The right panel of Figure 3 indicates schematically 
the effect of a shift in access from Fu to Fm on the 
bargaining in round T-1. The expected price-quota 
pair in round T shifts to the northeast (i.e., from the 
solid dot to the open dot), reflecting Fm’s relative 
preference, now more heavily weighted, for higher 
quotas at higher prices. To reduce clutter in this panel, 
we have omitted the labels on the lines representing 
participation constraints. The dashed lines parallel to 
the two farmers’ thin solid lines represent their partici-
pation constraints after the access shift: Necessarily, 
Fm’s constraint tightens while Fu’s slackens. The 
widely spaced dotted curves represent the proposers’ 
indifference curves through their respective optimal 
proposals. Since Ds is bound by Fm’s constraint and 
unaffected by Fu’s, the effect of the access shift is that 
Ds now proposes the open dot, yDs
T–1, rather than the 
(unlabeled) solid dot representing xDs
T–1. Thus, relative 
to the benchmark case, the lottery now facing players, 
conditional on reaching round T-1, is unambiguously 
more favorable for Fm and less favorable for Ds. For 
Fu, the net effect is indeterminate. Once again, the 
direct effect of the access shift is negative: Fu prefers 
his own proposal to Fm’s and weight initially assigned 
to the former is now assigned to the latter. But in this 
round there is an additional indirect effect associated 
with the shift in Ds’s proposal. Because the perturbed 
proposal is preferred by Fu to Ds’s original proposal, 
this effect benefits Fm.
These changes in round T-1 impact the locations of 
players’ participation constraints in round T-2. Figure 
4 depicts the bargaining in this round; we include 
the participation constraints for round T-1 as well for 
reference. The left panel represents the benchmark 
case; the participation constraint for player r in round 
T-2 is represented by the thick curve, Eur
T–1. The right 
panel indicates the cumulative effect of the access 
shift by round T-2. As in the right panel of Figure 3, 
participation constraints in the benchmark case are 
represented by solid lines and those after the access 
shift by dashed lines. Once again, each widely spaced 
Figure 4. Additional Effects in Round T-2
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dotted curve represents the indifference curve through 
some player’s optimal proposal. Reflecting the preced-
ing remarks, Ds’s participation constraint is slacker 
than in the benchmark case while Fm’s is tighter. As we 
have noted, Fu’s constraint could be slacker or tighter 
than in the benchmark. For this illustration, we have 
drawn it as slightly slacker, i.e., we have assumed that 
in round T-1 the loss to Fu resulting from the access 
shift dominates the gain to Fu due to Ds’s weaker 
performance.
In this round, there are additional indirect effects 
that have no counterpart in round T-1: As in round T-1, 
yDs
T–2 is southeast of the unlabeled solid dot, xDs
T–2. But, 
in this round, so too are yT
Fm
–2 and yFu
T–2 relative to the 
unlabeled solid dots xT
Fm
–2 and xFu








T–1). As a result, Ds’s participation constraint in 
round T-3 is further slackened relative to the original 
case since in this round all three proposals now yield 
him less utility. On the other hand, relative to the 
original case, each farmer benefits from these move-
ments so that, other things being equal, each farmer’s 
participation constraint in round T-3 will tighten. 
Once again, of course, these positive effects on Fu’s 
participation constraint are offset by the usual, nega-
tive direct effect of the access shift. 
It will now be apparent how the snowball we have 
been describing builds momentum as we induct 
backwards through the game tree. The impact of the 
access shift on Fm’s equilibrium payoff is the limit, 
as T increases without bound, of the impacts on Fm’s 
participation constraints in the first round of the 
bargaining in the game with T rounds. Without addi-
tional restrictions on parameters, given our functional 
form specifications, we cannot guarantee that these 
constraints will all tighten; however, our simulation 
results confirm that this property is extremely robust 
over a wide range of parameters.
5.2. Combining Forces:  
Impact of a Common Spokesman for Farmers
In section 5.2 and section 5.3, we return to the com-
plete specification of our model. We consider the 
effect on farm coalition performance of introducing 
a spokesman charged with the role of representing 
farmers’ collective interests. The spokesman is similar 
to other players in that he has a nonzero access prob-
ability; he differs in that his approval is not required in 
order for a proposal to be accepted. Formally, there is 
no participation constraint associated with the spokes-
man. (Think of him as an attorney hired to represent 
the interests of his clients: Ultimately, the clients 
themselves, not the attorney, must decide whether 
or not to accept any proposed deal.) The utility func-
tion that the spokesman maximizes is defined as the 
simple average of the three farmers’ utility functions. 
We refer to this as the average farmer utility function. In 
this section we consider the effect of transferring ac-
cess from farmers to the spokesman, holding constant 
the absolute access vector for nonfarmer parties and 
the individual access probabilities of farmers relative 
to each other.
Our goal is to explore the natural conjecture that 
farmers will negotiate more effectively as a group 
the more they can present a “united front” at the 
bargaining table. When an individual farmer makes 
a proposal, his objective is to advance his own inter-
ests, typically at the expense of other members of 
the farmer coalition. When farmers’ proposals are 
weighted according to their access probabilities, farm-
ers collectively suffer because each farmer fails to take 
account of other farmers’ interests. The spokesman, 
on the other hand, will internalize any externalities 
that result from farmers’ pursuit of their individual 
self-interest, subject to his objective function’s equal 
weighting of the three farmers’ utilities. We would 
expect, therefore, that the equilibrium value of the 
average farmer utility function will increase with the 
spokesman’s access.
A number of questions arise in the context of our 
particular model: Does the spokesman always improve 
coalition performance? Under what conditions will 
the spokesman’s contributions have the greatest 
impact? Which farmers benefit from the spokesman’s 
participation and which, if any, lose and why? The 
“why” question is, in our view, particularly interesting 
because it focuses attention on the precise nature of 
the externalities that are internalized by the spokes-
man—how these externalities differentially affect the 
different members of the farmer coalition and, most 
important, how they impact the bargaining perfor-
mance of the farmer coalition.Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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We address these questions for six specifications, 
varying both the issue space (CPCQ, CPIQ, IPCQ) 
and hydrological conditions (normal vs. drought). 
Throughout section 5.2 (and section 5.3 as well), we 
focus on the case in which Ds is default strong across 
all six specifications. (We say that a member of the 
antifarmer group (as defined in section 4.2) is default 
strong if his participation constraint is binding on 
all farmers and the spokesman in the final round of 
negotiations.27) The results of our simulation experi-
ments are summarized below. Most striking is the 
counterintuitive result that, under normal conditions 
in regime IPCQ, all farmers’ utilities actually decline 
as the spokesman gains access! Our other results are 
as follows: (1) Comparing his effect on farmer coali-
tion performance in regime CPCQ relative to the other 
two regimes, the spokesman has a negligible effect 
under normal conditions and no effect whatsoever 
under drought conditions. (2) As the spokesman gains 
access in regimes IPCQ and CPIQ, Fu’s equilibrium 
utility always declines; Fm’s, Fd’s, and the average 
farmer’s equilibrium utilities increase except in regime 
IPCQ, normal conditions; and equilibrium utilities 
for all members of the antifarmer group move in the 
opposite direction from the change in the average 
farmer’s utility.
One can obtain intuition for each of these results 
through a detailed study of players’ final-round 
proposals. Once these final-round details are well 
understood, most of the equilibrium comparative stat-
ics properties can be deduced readily by applying the 
usual backward-induction logic, taking into account 
the snowball effects illustrated in section 5.1. To illus-
trate how this logic works, we shall see that in the final 
round (round T) the spokesman discriminates against 
Fu to the benefit of other farmers so that Fu’s participa-
tion constraint in round T-1 becomes slacker as the 
spokesman gains access. In the penultimate round, 
typically, the spokesman again discriminates against 
Fu for the same reason. (The degree of discrimination 
will typically be less dramatic in round T-1 than in T 
because participation constraints become tighter as we 
move backward through the inductive chain, leaving 
the spokesman with less room to maneuver.) Thus, 
in round T-1 there will be two reinforcing effects—his 
slacker participation constraint and the discrimina-
tion against him by the spokesman—that contribute to 
a weaker performance by Fu. Typically, this weakness 
will compound as we work back through the induc-
tive chain to the solution: The result, typically, will be 
that Fu’s expected solution payoff will decline as the 
spokesman gains access. We emphasize the qualifica-
tion “typically” because, for some parameter values, 
countervailing effects can reverse the impact of the 
last-round effects. Since no such reversals arise in the 
experiments reported in this monograph, the details 
we overlook by focusing on the final round, though 
interesting, are not critical.
Regime CPCQ
In this regime, the farmer coalition’s welfare increases 
with the spokesman’s involvement under normal 
conditions. Under drought conditions, it makes no dif-
ference whatsoever. The explanation for this difference 
is as follows. In the absence of hydrology constraints, 
farmers maximize their utilities subject to a common 
political supply schedule for quotas (see section 4.2). 
Because farmers have different optimal locations along 
this schedule, their proposals will differ. If hydrology 
constraints bind sufficiently tightly, however, the low-
est quota level on the schedule that will satisfy these 
constraints will exceed even the level that would be 
optimal for Fm, who has the highest willingness to pay 
for quotas. Under these circumstances, all preference 
differences between farmers will be suppressed at the 
bargaining table since all farmers will be obliged to 
propose the same, super-optimal quota level. When 
the spokesman participates, he will be subject to ex-
actly the same constraints; hence, his proposal will be 
indistinguishable from the common proposal offered 
by farmers. For this reason, if the drought is suffi-
ciently intense, the transfer of access to the spokesman 
will have no impact at all. (For the same reason, the 
bargaining outcome will also be independent of the 
distribution of access across farmers.)
Under normal conditions, when the hydrology con-
straints do not bind, the preference variation between 
farmers is no longer suppressed and the spokesman 
can make a difference. Not surprisingly, however, his 
27  Surprisingly, we find that changing the identity of the default strong player has little impact on our results.Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
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role in regime CPCQ is relatively insignificant since 
farmers in this regime are constrained to treat them-
selves and other farmers equally; there are simply no 
opportunities for self-promotion at the expense of 
the group. The spokesman’s role is limited to merely 
reducing risk. As noted previously, in the absence of 
hydrology constraints, farmers’ final-round propos-
als will differ in accordance with their willingnesses 
to pay: Fm proposes the highest quotas, prices, and 
dam capacity levels and Fd proposes the lowest. When 
the spokesman’s access increases, farmers’ expected 
utilities increase somewhat because their risk expo-
sure is reduced: Their utilities from the spokesman’s 
proposal exceeds the average of their utilities from all 
three farmers’ proposals. For the model specifications 
we consider, this reduction in risk translates into an 
increase in farmers’ solution payoffs. We should not 
expect, however, that this property will be robust 
across a wide range of parameter specifications since 
other parties at the bargaining table also benefit from 
the spokesman’s participation. As his access increases, 
the variance of farmers’ proposals decreases to the 
benefit of all risk-averse parties. Had the other nego-
tiators been significantly more risk averse than the 
farmers, their gain from the reduction in risk might 
have exceeded the farmers’ gain, inducing, possibly, a 
decline in farmers’ solution payoffs as the spokesman’s 
access increased.
In contrast to CPCQ, each farmer in regime CPIQ 
or IPCQ has ample opportunity to pursue his own 
interests at the expense of other farmers. He does so by 
proposing either low quotas (in CPIQ) or high prices 
(in IPCQ) for other farmers and either a high quota 
or a low price for himself. We refer to this individually 
rational pursuit of self-interest as beggar-thy-neighbor 
behavior. Its implications, explored hereafter, are 
subtle and diverse and vary depending on the regime 
and hydrological conditions. As noted earlier, much 
can be learned by comparing the spokesman’s pro-
posal in the final round of bargaining to the average 
of farmers’ individual proposals in that round.
In the discussion of regime CPIQ that follows, we 
consider three kinds of averages. For a given farmer, 
we consider the mean of the three subbasin quota 
proposals made by that farmer and refer to this as the 
farmer’s mean quota. For a given subbasin, we examine 
the average of the three farmers’ quota proposals for 
that basin and refer to this as an average subbasin quota 
proposal. Each average subbasin proposal is compared 
to the spokesman’s proposal for that basin. Finally, 
we examine the average of these subbasin averages 
and refer to this as the farmers’ overall average quota 
proposal. This last scalar is compared to the average 
of the quotas that the spokesman proposes for the 
three basins.
Regime CPIQ
In regime CPIQ we focus exclusively on normal con-
ditions since in this regime the spokesman’s role is 
independent of hydrological conditions. In both cases 
the overall average quota proposal in the final round 
is inefficient from a coalition perspective because the 
differences between the average subbasin proposals 
do not efficiently reflect the different costs that quotas 
in different subbasins impose on the environment. 
To illuminate this inefficiency, Figure 5 compares 
the proposals made by farmers and the spokesman 
in the final round of bargaining under normal condi-
tions. The upper panel of Figure 5 depicts graphically, 
from left to right, the final-round proposals made by 
each of the three farmers, the spokesman’s proposal, 
and the average of the three proposals by farmers. 
The bar heights are normalized so that the height of 
each class of variable represents the player’s proposal 
relative to the average of four proposals, consisting of 
the three proposals by individual farmers and one 
by the spokesman, e.g., farmer i’s quota for his own 
subbasin is represented as his proposal divided by 
the mean of all quota proposals by either farmers or 
the spokesman. Thus, a proposal is above (below) 
average if the corresponding bar is taller (shorter) 
than 1. From left to right, each cluster of nine bars 
represents the common price, three subbasin quota 
levels, the mean farmer quota, the average capaci-
ties for dams #1 and #2, the capacity of dam #3, the 
average of upstream and midstream residual flows, 
and downstream residual flows. (Recall that, while 
players do not explicitly propose residual flow levels, 
they are implied by the variables that are proposed.) 
Utility levels for Ds and Ev are determined, at least to 
a first-order approximation, by the right-most four 
bars in each cluster.Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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The lower left and middle panels of Figure 5 depict 
the difference between the spokesman’s proposal 
and the average of the three farmers’ proposals. In 
the lower left panel, the right-most bar compares the 
average of the quotas proposed by the spokesman to 
the farmers’ overall average quota proposal. Each of 
the other bars compares the spokesman’s proposal for 
some subbasin to the corresponding farmers’ average 
subbasin proposal. The lower middle panel reports 
the differences for the remaining variables. The lower 
right panel reports the difference between players’ 
payoffs from the spokesman’s proposal and the aver-
age of their payoffs from the farmers’ proposals. Since 
the experiment involves a shift in access away from 
farmers toward the spokesman, a player’s participa-
tion constraint in the penultimate round will tighten 
(slacken) if and only if the player’s bar in this panel 
is positive (negative).
Figure 5 illustrates a number of significant points. 
First, Fd’s proposal is much more “efficient” than Fu’s 
and somewhat more efficient than Fm’s in terms of its 
impact on dam capacities and, therefore, prices. Spe-
cifically, while Fd’s mean quota proposal is almost as 
high as Fm’s and much higher than Fu’s, the residual 
flows implied by Fd’s proposal are roughly comparable 
with those implied by the other farmers’ proposals; 
moreover, Fd’s proposed dam capacities and, con-
sequently, proposed common price are much lower. 
These differences arise because, whenever residual 
flows are reduced at some location along the river, 
flows at every measurement point downstream from 
that point are reduced as well. Thus, flow reductions 
from subbasin U imply matching reductions in sub-
basins M and D while reductions from subbasin D 
have no impact on the flows through subbasins farther 
upstream. For this reason, a unit of quota assigned to 
Fd has, very roughly, one-third the total environmental 
impact of a unit assigned to Fu. Consequently, Fd can 
“acquire” for his subbasin essentially the same total 
level of quotas as can the other two farmers but with 
much less dam capacity and, since prices rise with 
dam capacity, a much lower price as well. The remain-
ing three points illustrated by Figure 5 are all closely 
related to the point just discussed.
Second, comparing the spokesman’s proposal to 
the average of the farmers’ proposals, observe that 
Fu is the clear loser: The spokesman’s price is higher 
than the average price while the spokesman allocates a 
quota to Fu that is much lower than the farmers’ aver-
age quota proposal for Fu. This difference can be traced 
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den; consequently, this benefit is more than offset by 
the negative tax implications of the increase in dam 
construction under the spokesman’s proposal.
The end result of all these considerations is that, as 
the spokesman’s access increases, there is an increase 
in Fm’s and Fd’s expected utilities conditional on 
reaching the final round of bargaining. Mg’s expected 
utility increases as well because of the additional 
dam construction under the spokesman’s proposal. 
Because his participation constraint is binding on the 
spokesman as well as all farmers, Ds is unaffected in 
this round by the participation of the spokesman. 
(In earlier rounds, however, his utility declines.) Ev’s, 
Tp’s, and Fu’s expected utilities decline. Under normal 
conditions, these qualitative effects are all reinforced 
as we move backward up the inductive chain to the 
solution of the game. Under drought conditions, the 
effect of the spokesman’s participation on the solu-
tion is comparable except for a couple of relatively 
insignificant differences.
Regime IPCQ
In our discussion of regime IPCQ, we again refer to 
several different averages. We maintain a parallel 
terminological convention to the previous one, dis-
tinguishing this time between the average subbasin 
price, the farmer mean price, and the overall average 
price. We also compare the average common quota 
proposed by farmers to the common quota proposed 
by the spokesman.
In contrast to regime CPIQ, the qualitative impact 
of the spokesman in this regime depends very much 
on hydrological conditions. Once again, the similari-
ties and differences are revealed by an examination 
of the final round of bargaining. The details of the 
following discussion can be summarized as fol-
lows. Under both drought and normal conditions, 
individual farmers pursue collectively inefficient 
beggar-thy-neighbor strategies, proposing low prices 
for themselves and high prices for others. In both 
scenarios the spokesman’s participation mitigates this 
inefficiency. There is, however, a second impact of the 
spokesman’s involvement. In normal conditions it is 
a negative one for farmers that dominates the ben-
efit of the first impact. Specifically, the spokesman’s 
common quota proposal is greater than the farmers’ 
to the relative environmental cost considerations 
noted previously: Quotas assigned to subbasin U are 
the most environmentally costly of all quotas.
Third, note from the top panel of Figure 5 that 
the spokesman can induce Ds to accept a higher 
overall average quota level than that proposed by the 
farmers at a slightly lower price. The spokesman can 
accomplish this because he allocates quotas across 
subbasins more efficiently than do the farmers. In 
particular, he discriminates against player Fu so that 
residual flows below the environmentally sensitive 
subbasin D are higher under his proposal than under 
Fm’s proposal. 
Fourth, while each farmer proposes a much larger 
quota for his own subbasin, there is little variation 
between the farmers’ three average subbasin propos-
als. On the other hand, while the spokesman’s quota 
allocation is more evenly distributed across farmers 
than is any individual farmer’s, it is much less evenly 
distributed than the average subbasin proposals. Once 
again, this reflects the fact that the spokesman’s pro-
posal efficiently balances the relative environmental 
costs of assigning quotas to different farmers against 
the relative benefits that farmers derive from them.
The question arises: Why do individual farmers 
not take into account at least the relative environ-
mental costs of assigning quotas to other farmers? 
For example, why does Fm assign roughly equal quota 
levels to Fu and Fd? The explanation can be traced to 
beggar-thy-neighbor behavior: Unlike the spokesman, 
each individual farmer assigns to himself the highest 
possible quota; as a result, the heterogeneity bound 
on individual proposals (section 4.2) prevents him 
from optimally differentiating the quotas assigned to 
the other two farmers.
Our final observation relates to the lower middle 
and right panels of the figure. Relative to the farmers’ 
average proposal, the spokesman negotiates signifi-
cantly higher levels of dam capacities in exchange for 
slightly higher levels of residual flows. This trade-off 
leaves Ds indifferent because his participation con-
straint is binding in the final round but negatively 
impacts Ev who, relative to Ds, is concerned more 
about dam capacities and less about residual flows. 
Similarly, while Tp derives some benefit under the 
spokesman’s proposal from the increase in residual 
flows, his primary concern is to reduce the tax bur-Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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average common quota in drought conditions, while 
in normal conditions his proposal is less than this 
average. Since Ds’s constraint is binding on all farm-
ers and the spokesman and he dislikes the marginal 
quotas less than either Ev or Tp, these latter players 
are made worse off by the spokesman’s participation 
in drought conditions and better off by his participa-
tion in normal conditions. Moreover, farmer Fm, who 
is strategically important in the sense we discussed in 
section 5.1, prefers the spokesman’s proposal to the 
average of farmers’ proposals in drought conditions 
while in normal conditions this preference is reversed. 
In each hydrological scenario, these attitudes toward 
the spokesman’s involvement reinforce each other 
and initiate inductive chains that lead, ultimately, to 
diametrically opposed comparative statics effects for 
drought versus normal conditions.
To understand in more detail the differences 
between normal and drought conditions, compare 
Figure 6 with Figure 8. The two figures have the 
same structure as Figure 5 except that the locations 
of prices and quotas are exchanged. The bottom left 
panels of the two figures are qualitatively similar 
except for the price paid by farmer Fm. In both cases 
the farmers’ overall average price proposal is higher 
than the spokesman’s average price. On the other 
hand, the bottom middle panels of Figure 6 and Figure 
8 are diametrically different. These panels depict the 
difference between the spokesman’s and the aver-
age farmer’s final-round proposals for quotas, dam 
capacities, and implied residual flows. Under normal 
conditions, the spokesman proposes lower levels for 
all of these variables; under drought conditions, his 
proposals are higher.
Our explanation of this difference begins with a 
detailed consideration of normal conditions (Figure 
6). The difference between the average price proposed 
by the spokesman and the overall average price 
proposed by farmers can be attributed to beggar-thy-
neighbor behavior by farmers. As discussed in section 
5.1, farmers face an upward-sloping political supply 
schedule for quotas. As the top panels of the two 
figures indicate, each farmer assigns very high prices 
to others and proposes a common quota level that is 
individually optimal for that farmer to a first-order 
approximation28 given the low price that he, himself, 
is required to pay. This behavior, while individually 
rational, creates negative externalities: Since each 
28  A farmer does derive disutility from other farmers paying high prices. However, this disutility only arises as part of his second-
order utility term. The results of this simulation demonstrate that the second-order utility term does not have a substantial effect.
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farmer is more likely to be required to pay the high 
price assigned to him by some other farmer than the 
low price he has assigned to himself, he is, on average, 
trading quotas for prices at a rate that he would con-
sider unacceptable if he were required to pay this 
rate with certainty. The spokesman internalizes this 
externality and purchases slightly fewer quotas. The 
qualitative properties of the lower middle panel now 
follow from the familiar linkage between quotas and 
prices: When quotas are reduced, the capacity of dam 
#3 can be reduced as well so that budget balance can 
be maintained with lower prices.
The comparison between the spokesman’s pro-
posal and the farmers’ is illustrated by Figure 7, which 
depicts the level set, LS(uAF), of the average farmer 
utility function passing through the overall average 
farmer proposal labeled as xT
AF. Reflecting the fact that, 
on average, farmers are overpaying for the marginal 
quota, this level set is less steeply sloped at xT
AF than 
the induced level set in price-quota space (see section 
4.2) for Ds, whose participation constraint binds on 
farmer proposals in the final round. As it turns out, 
each farmer proposes the dam configuration that is 
globally optimal from Ds’s perspective, given the com-
mon quota level, so that Ds’s participation constraint, 
denoted by u0
Ds(AF), is vertical at the overall average 
farmer proposal.
Relative to the average farmer, the spokesman 
obtains efficiency gains in two respects. First, he 
rationalizes the distribution of prices across farmers: 
efficiency dictates a shift in the price burden toward 
Fu, who has the most irrigated area and, hence, the 
greatest revenue leverage, and Fm, who has the highest 
willingness to pay. With this adjustment, a given quota 
level can be achieved at a lower average price so that 
Ds’s induced participation constraint in price-quota 
space, u0
Ds(Sp), shifts downward relative to u0
Ds(AF). 
Second, he internalizes the externality that farmers 
were imposing on each other by beggaring their neigh-
bors, equating Ds’s marginal rate of substitution (MRS) 
of prices for quotas with that of the average farmer. 
The net effect of these changes is that the spokesman 
proposes the vector xT
Sp and thus obtains the higher 
utility level, u′ AF, for the average farmer.
The utility implications of these differences for 
each player are reflected in the bottom right-panel 
of Figure 6. While farmers benefit on average from 
the spokesman’s involvement (a slightly lower quota 
at a significantly lower overall average price), the 
distribution of benefits is highly skewed: Fd benefits 
hugely from the spokesman’s redistribution of prices 
while both Fu and Fm are negatively impacted. Mg’s 
budget is unaffected by the spokesman’s involvement 
(since his budget constraint binds), but his utility is 
negatively impacted because he prefers larger dams to 
smaller. Apart from Fd, the other beneficiaries from 
the spokesman’s participation are Ev and Tp. Relative 
to the overall average farmer proposal, the spokesman 
reduces dam size (hence, lowering prices) in exchange 
for lower residual flows at an exchange rate that leaves 
Ds indifferent. Compared to Ds, however, Ev and Tp 
have a relative preference for smaller dams (steeper 
induced MRSs in quota-price space) so that, at the 
exchange rate that leaves Ds indifferent, both Ev and 
Tp benefit from the trade.
We now turn to drought conditions (Figure 8). 
Once again, farmers Fu and Fd beggar their neigh-
bors. In this case, however, Fm’s capacity to beggar his 
neighbors is limited by hydrological and technologi-
cal constraints. As explained in section 4.2, farmers 
can acquire quotas in this regime only by increasing 
the size of dam #2; moreover, the “cost” of quota 
increases in terms of dam increases is significantly 
higher when the hydrology constraint on subbasin 
M binds. As a result, farmer Fm, who has the highest 
willingness to pay for quotas, is obliged to propose the 
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maximum feasible size for dam #2 in order to satisfy 
the hydrology constraint in drought conditions and 
is unable to achieve the quota level that is optimal 
for him when he beggars his neighbors, subject only 
to the heterogeneity constraint in normal conditions. 
Even though the other two farmers, who are not capac-
ity constrained, overspend on quotas in the way we 
would anticipate, the capacity constraint on Fm binds 
sufficiently tightly that the farmers’ overall average 
quota proposal is actually suboptimal from the average 
farmer’s perspective.
In contrast to normal conditions, the result is that 
the indifference curve of the average farmer utility 
function passing through the overall average farmer 
proposal is steeper at this point than Ds’s participa-
tion constraint. That is, because of Fm’s technological 
constraint, the average farmer would in this instance 
choose to buy more quotas than he is purchasing under 
the overall average farmer proposal (see Figure 9). 
Once again, the spokesman achieves two kinds of 
efficiency gains relative to the average farmer. As in 
normal conditions, he rationalizes the distribution of 
prices across farmers so that a given quota level can 
be acquired at a lower average price. But, in contrast 
to normal conditions, he now proposes slightly more 
quotas than the average farmer.29 The implications 
of these differences are reflected in the bottom right 
panel of Figure 8. In all critical respects (Fd and Fu 
are not critical), the signs are the reverse of those in 
Figure 6: Fm in this case prefers the spokesman’s pro-
posal to the average farmer’s; Ds is unaffected by the 
spokesman’s involvement because his participation 
constraint binds; Ev and Tp are negatively rather than 
positively impacted because quotas increase rather 
than decrease; and Mg’s budget remains in balance 
but benefits from the increase in dam capacity.
Now compare the implications of the bottom right 
panels of Figure 6 and Figure 8 for the penultimate 
and earlier rounds of bargaining. We begin with 
normal conditions. Except for player Fd,30 whose stra-
29  Like Fm, Sp is unable to achieve a tangency with Ds’s participation constraint because he has pushed dam #2 to its maximum 
feasible size.
30  Fd is negatively impacted by the all of the changes in participation constraints; however, his benefit from the spokesman’s 
rationalization of prices relative to the overall average farmer proposal is large enough to dominate all these negative effects. 
But, since Fd’s participation constraint is never binding in the critical final rounds of bargaining, these effects do not impact the 
outcome of the bargaining.
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tegic role is minimal in this scenario, the qualitative 
effects reported on all of the players are reinforced by 
secondary effects in the penultimate round: Tp’s par-
ticipation constraint, which is binding on all farmers 
in this round, becomes tighter with the spokesman’s 
involvement and this weakens all farmers’ proposals. 
The constraints that bind Mg are Ev’s and Tp’s, so his 
proposal is weaker as well. Fm’s constraint, which is 
binding on all nonfarmers, becomes slacker as the 
spokesman’s access increases and this strengthens 
all nonfarmers’ proposals. These qualitative penul-
timate-round net effects are all transmitted back to 
the solution of the game: As the spokesman’s access 
probability increases, all nonfarmers gain while Mg 
and all farmers except Fd lose.
Under drought conditions, Fm’s and Mg’s penulti-
mate-round participation constraints become tighter 
as the spokesman’s access increases; since both play-
ers’ constraints are binding on the antifarmer group, 
this group does worse in the penultimate round as the 
spokesman’s access increases. On the other hand, Ev’s 
constraint becomes slacker while Ds’s is unchanged, 
and this benefits all farmers. For Fm and Fd, this 
effect reinforces the positive effects that occurred in 
the final round and occur in this round as well. For 
Fu, however, the negative impact of the redistribution 
of the price burden dominates the benefit from Ev’s 
slacker constraint and the net effect of the spokesman 
on this player is negative. These effects are transmitted 
backward through the inductive chain so that in the 
solution to the game all members of the antifarmer 
group are negatively impacted by the spokesman’s 
involvement while Fm and Fd benefit. Fu is negatively 
impacted. Because subbasin U has the largest irrigated 
area, the spokesman “sacrifices” Fu by assigning him 
a very high quota price.
Summary and Discussion
The qualitative comparative statics results we obtain 
in this experiment reveal that, in negotiations where 
there is significant scope for divergent behavior among 
coalition members (i.e., our regimes IPCQ and CPIQ), 
the intervention of a spokesman will usually, but not 
necessarily, benefit the coalition as a group. In the ex-
periments we consider, the impact of the spokesman’s 
participation on the coalition’s equilibrium payoff 
depends, basically, on two factors: his impact on the 
expected quota proposal and on Fm’s expected utility 
conditional on reaching the final round of bargaining. 
The expected quota proposal is important because 
it impacts, through its effect on dam capacities and 
residual flows, the well-being of the nonfarmer players 
Ev and Tp, whose participation constraints are slack 
in the final round but bind in all earlier rounds. Any 
proposal that leaves Ds indifferent makes these two 
players better off. Fm’s conditional expected utility 
plays a pivotal role for precisely the reason that we 
identified in the stripped-down context of section 5.1: 
Because Fm’s constraint is binding on the antifarmer 
group in the penultimate round of bargaining, Fm’s 
performance in the final round is a primary deter-
minant of all farmers’ expected performance in the 
penultimate and earlier rounds. In all the experiments 
we report here, these two effects reinforce each other. 
For other parameterizations, however, this need not 
be the case, at which point our analysis of the spokes-
man’s impact would require much more delicacy.
It is significant that, when the coalition does 
benefit from the spokesman’s participation, it does 
so only because he can discriminate against one of 
the coalition members. As we have observed, Fu is 
always the target of discrimination by the spokesman 
since the constraints that bind him will be relaxed by 
a mean-preserving perturbation in subbasin prices 
(quotas) involving an increase (decrease) in Fu’s price 
(quota). In IPCQ, a unit increase in Fu’s price raises 
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more revenue than a unit increase in either one of 
the other farmers’ prices. In CPIQ a unit increase in 
Fu’s quota requires a larger increase in dam capacity 
than a unit increase in either one of the other farm-
ers’ quotas. Hence, the spokesman, whose task is 
to maximize the sum of farmers’ utilities, assigns a 
higher price and lower quota to Fu. Anticipating this 
discrimination, we would expect that Fu would not 
agree to the appointment of a spokesman of the kind 
we model. (Of course, whenever the farmer group 
does better on average with the spokesman, Fu could 
in principle be sufficiently compensated with side 
payments that all coalition members would benefit 
from the spokesman’s participation.)
Our spokesman experiment illustrates dramatically 
the extreme sensitivity of our results to the importance 
of factors that one would not necessarily anticipate in 
the absence of a computational model. We observed 
that all of our comparative statics results are reversed 
in regime IPCQ when hydrological conditions change 
from normal to drought. We traced this reversal to the 
apparently inconsequential fact that, in the final round 
of bargaining under drought conditions, Fm proposes 
the maximum feasible capacity level for dam #2. This 
single technological constraint limits the extent to 
which Fm can squander the other farmers’ money and 
a chain of significant consequences follows.
We emphasize this example because it highlights 
the complex, delicate, and highly nonlinear nature 
of player interactions when they negotiate with 
each other in an environment characterized by high 
dimensionality and multiple “sharp edges,” such as 
the present one. This environment contrasts sharply 
with the smooth, low-dimensional, stylized character-
izations of the world that one is obliged to construct 
in order to generate analytical comparative statics 
results. While environments of the latter kind are 
more elegant and transparent than ours and more 
likely to yield robust results, in many instances the 
cost of these positive attributes is that the simpler 
models fail to reflect the full richness of economic 
actors’ interactions, either with each other or with the 
institutional contexts within which they must operate. 
In the experiment we have just discussed, a technologi-
cal constraint that might have been assumed away in 
order to construct a simplified model with analytical 
comparative statics results proved to be an important 
determinant of the negotiated outcome.
Finally, our results in regime IPCQ provide a coun-
terexample to the intuitively self-evident conjecture 
that the spokesman’s participation will always benefit 
the farmer coalition. It is true that, when members of 
this coalition pursue their individual self-interests, 
the expected result of their activities will generally be 
suboptimal from the perspective of the coalition as a 
whole. For example, each farmer in IPCQ proposes a 
higher quota level than he would have proposed if he 
were required to pay his fair share of quota costs.31 The 
conjecture mentioned is intuitively obvious precisely 
because we would expect the spokesman always to 
internalize any negative externalities arising from 
beggar-thy-neighbor behavior by individual farmers. 
Indeed, the spokesman does exactly this. Our conjec-
ture fails in regime IPCQ, however, in part32 because 
the externality that is negative in this narrow sense 
turns out to be positive in a broader sense—beggar-thy-
neighbor behavior hurts Ds, Ev, and Tp more than it 
hurts the farmers and, in fact, benefits the manager—so 
that the farmer coalition’s equilibrium performance 
actually declines when the spokesman internalizes it. 
On reflection, this result should not be at all surpris-
ing: A fundamental lesson from game theory is that 
behavior that is suboptimal by decision-theoretic 
criteria can, in a game-theoretic context, increase a 
player’s equilibrium payoff relative to behavior that 
is decision-theoretically optimal.33
5.3. Limiting Dissension: Reducing  
the Degree of proposal heterogeneity
As we observed in section 5.2, the spokesman’s role 
was essentially negligible in regime CPCQ but sig-
nificant in the other two regimes. It seems probable, 
therefore, that, in regimes IPCQ and CPIQ, reducing 
31  We reiterate that it is the political supply schedule for quotas that is upward sloping.
32  A second factor is that, while the spokesman enhances average farmer utility, in normal conditions he reduces Fm’s utility 
and it is Fm’s utility rather than farmers’ average utility that matters in the final round of the game.
33  See, for example, the vast literature on reputation building beginning with Kreps and Wilson and Milgrom and Roberts.Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
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the degree of permissible heterogeneity among player 
proposals will have similar effects. As we have noted 
above in our earlier discussion of the bargaining 
space, players in our base-case scenarios for regimes 
IPCQ and CPIQ are constrained in the extent to which 
they can pursue their own subbasins’ interests at the 
expense of other subbasins. Specifically, in regime 
CPIQ (IPCQ), the specification of the bargaining space 
includes an upper bound on the standard deviation 
of the three quotas (prices) proposed by any player. 
In this section we explore the impact of successively 
relaxing these bounds, again restricting our attention 
to the case in which, in the final round of bargaining, 
Ds’s constraint is binding on all farmers and on Mg.
A natural conjecture arising from section 5.2 is that 
farmers’ utilities will increase or decrease on average 
as these restrictions become tighter, depending on 
whether the average farmer benefits from the partici-
pation of the spokesman. In regime CPIQ, for example, 
we observed from the spokesman experiment that 
self-interested, beggar-thy-neighbor behavior by indi-
vidual farmers served to weaken the performance of 
the farmer coalition. In the present experiment, we test 
the conjecture that, when we successively tighten our 
bound on the extent of heterogeneity among proposals 
and thus increasingly proscribe this kind of behavior, 
farmers will do better in equilibrium on average. It is 
less straightforward to make predictions for regime 
IPCQ since in this case the impact of the spokesman 
turned out to be counterintuitive under normal con-
ditions. Even so, it still seems intuitive that, when we 
limit the extent to which each farmer can favor his 
own subbasin at the expense of the others, farmers 
will again do better on average.
Except for one of the four scenarios we discuss 
in this section—CPIQ, normal conditions—these 
conjectures are not supported by our simulation 
experiments. In regime CPIQ, farmers benefit on aver-
age when the heterogeneity bound is tightened under 
normal conditions but do worse when it is tightened 
under drought conditions. In regime IPCQ under both 
normal and drought conditions, the average farmer 
does monotonically worse as the bound tightens. 
Moreover, an analysis of our simulation results reveals 
that the forces driving our comparative statics results 
are quite different from the ones we anticipated.
Why in regime CPIQ are farmers positively 
impacted by a tighter bound in normal conditions but 
negatively impacted in drought conditions? To answer 
this question, we focus, as usual, on the final round 
of negotiations. We restrict our attention to farmer Fd, 
for whom the effect of hydrological conditions is most 
dramatic. In the discussion that follows, it is important 
to keep in mind the topography of the Adour Basin 
(see Figure 2 in section 4.2), noting in particular that 
both Fd’s quota allocation and the capacity of dam #2 
affect residual flows only below subbasin D.
In section 4, we discussed how to project play-
ers’ preferences onto price-quota space in regime 
CPCQ. We now extend this discussion to the more 
complex situation that arises in regime CPIQ. Figure 
10 collapses Fd’s optimization problem down to two 
dimensions. The curve labeled “water supply func-
tion” maps the proposed capacity of dam #2 (on the 
vertical axis) to water flows gross of farm quotas below 
subbasin D (on the horizontal axis). Nonfarmers care 
about residual water flows, which are gross flows 
minus any quotas allocated to farmers. The curve 
labeled “Ds’s participation constraint” is the level set of 
Ds’s utility function at his default utility, representing 
his willingness to trade off dam size against residual 
flow. The slope of Ds’s level set is steeper than the slope 
of the “supply function” if and only if the increase 
in residual flows resulting from an expansion of the 
dam’s size increases Ds’s utility at a faster rate than the 
rate at which Ds’s utility declines because he dislikes 
dams. For any given capacity for dam #2, farmer Fd 
can assign quotas that sum to the horizontal distance 
between Ds’s level set and the water supply function. 
The heterogeneity constraint restricts the fraction of 
this distance that Fd can assign to his own subbasin. 
In Figure 10 the heterogeneity bound determines the 
lengths of the solid, horizontal, double-ended arrows 
(Fd’s quota) relative to the lengths of the dotted arrows 
(Fm and Fu’s quotas). As the constraint tightens, this 
fraction shrinks. The key point of the figure is that, 
since each farmer naturally assigns the largest fraction 
of total quotas to his own subbasin, a tightening of the 
heterogeneity bound means that aggregate quotas must 
be increased in order to deliver to a given farmer the 
same quota level he was receiving initially. It neces-
sarily follows that as the heterogeneity bound tightens Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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there is an increase in the tension between farmers and 
those stakeholders who value residual flows. 
Since, ceteris paribus, the capacity of dam #2 
determines the common quota price through the 
administrative budget constraint, we can reinterpret 
Figure 10 to represent the trade-off facing farmer Fd, 
which is essentially between quota and price. When 
considering Fd’s options, mentally relabel the verti-
cal axis as the quota price implied by the given dam 
capacity and the horizontal axis as quotas and then 
interpret all curves associated with Fd as either oppor-
tunity sets or indifference curves in price-quota space. 
Assuming that quotas are optimally divided among 
farmers Fu and Fm from Fd’s perspective, we can trace 
out the frontier of the choice set available to Fd. For our 
baseline case, this is indicated by the solid line labeled 
“Fd’s feasible set: loose constraint” when the constraint 
tightens the feasible set contracts, as indicated by the 
dashed line labeled “Fd’s feasible set: tight constraint.” 
Note that the feasible set is “backward bending” if 
and only if, at the margin, Ds’s dislike of dam #2 
exceeds his fondness for residual flows. The solid 
and dashed lines labeled 
“Fd’s indifference curve” 
indicate the indifference 
curves determining the 
location of Fd’s optimal 
proposals both before and 
after the heterogeneity 
constraint tightens. The 
tangency points, indicated 
by oval-shaped dots, are 
characterized by the prop-
erty that the marginal cost 
to Fd—incurred because 
the common quota price 
must increase to satisfy 
the administrator’s bud-
get constraint—of a further 
increase in the dam’s size 
just offsets the marginal 
benefit to Fd from propos-
ing additional quotas for 
his own subbasin, taking 
into account the increases 
in Fm’s and Fu’s quotas 
that he must also propose 
in order to satisfy the heterogeneity constraint. When 
the constraint tightens, Fd pays a higher unit price for 
fewer quotas, reflecting the fact that both quotas and 
the residual numeraire are normal goods.
It should be emphasized that the two-dimensional 
Figure 10 is only a partial representation of the prob-
lem being modeled. In particular, the location of Ds’s 
participation constraint is not independent of the 
allocation of quotas among farmers. Consequently, it 
depends on the heterogeneity bound. Specifically, note 
in Figure 10 that pressure on upstream residual flows 
increases with the lengths of the horizontal dashed 
arrows but is independent of the lengths of the solid 
arrows. This implies that, when the constraint tightens 
while holding everything else in the figure constant, 
the line labeled “Ds’s participation constraint” now 
represents a lower level of utility because Ds cares 
also about upstream flows. In other words, Ds’s actual 
constraint moves to the right as the bound shrinks. 
Note also that, if farmer Fd were replaced in the figure 
by Fu, then the relationship between the heterogeneity 
bound and Ds’s constraint would be reversed: In this 
Figure 10. Farmer Fd’s Problem, Normal Conditions
water supply function
Quantity of water
Fu + Fm quota: loose
Fd quota: tight Fd quota: tight
Fd quota: loose
Fd’s feasible set: tight constraint
Fd’s feasible set: loose constraint
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case, a tightening of the bound would shift Ds’s con-
straint to the left.
We say that “drought conditions” apply when at 
least one of the hydrology constraints is binding. In 
our benchmark simulation of drought conditions, 
the hydrology constraints bind at the midstream 
and downstream measurement points; the upstream 
constraint is slack. When the heterogeneity bound 
tightens under these circumstances, farmer Fd is in 
an especially difficult position: To satisfy a tighter 
heterogeneity bound, he must reduce the quotas he 
assigns to himself and increase the quotas he assigns 
to upstream farmers. As we noted earlier, a one-to-one 
transfer of quotas upstream either doubles or triples 
the burden of satisfying residual flow requirements. 
Moreover, in our simulation, dam #1 is already at 
full capacity while dam #3 is already so large that 
the net marginal benefit to user Ds of increasing it 
still further is negative. Since dam #2 services only 
the downstream basin, farmer Fd cannot increase the 
supply of water to the upstream and midstream basins 
without reducing Ds’s utility. (In contrast, in normal 
conditions, an increase in dam #3 creates a net surplus 
utility for Ds, which gives Fd room to maneuver.) Since 
Ds’s participation constraint is binding, he must be 
compensated somehow for this loss. By a process of 
elimination, the only feasible way that Fd can provide 
this compensation is to reduce the mean quota alloca-
tion he proposes and to reduce the size of dam #2.
To summarize, Fd’s response in normal conditions 
is to buy fewer quotas for his own subbasin at a higher 
price and to increase the size of dam #3 to accommo-
date the increased pressure on residual flows induced 
by the forced reallocation of the quotas he proposes. 
In drought conditions he has less room to maneuver 
and is obliged to reduce the size of dam #2. As we have 
discussed many times, when a farmer adjusts dam 
sizes and residual flows, he does it on terms that leave 
user Ds indifferent. But Ev and Tp dislike dams more 
than Ds—if they had been included in Figure 10, their 
participation constraints would have been flatter than 
Ds’s—so that they benefit (suffer) whenever a farmer 
reduces (increases) a dam size.
We now broaden our discussion to include the 
other players, considering each scenario in turn. For 
the four cases we consider, the effects of the hetero-
geneity restriction in the final round of bargaining 
are summarized in Figures 11–15. The information 
conveyed by these figures parallels the information 
conveyed by the corresponding figures in section 
5.2. The difference is that we compare farmers’ pro-
posals when we move from the tightest to the loosest 
specification of the heterogeneity bound instead of 
comparing farmer proposals to the spokesman’s.
The Final Round of Bargaining:  
Regime CPIQ, Normal Conditions
Observe from the bottom left panel of Figure 11 that 
the overall average quota proposal declines as the 
bound tightens, although farmer Fu’s mean quota 
proposal increases. From the lower middle panel, the 
mean common price proposal increases and there are 
increases in the means of farmers’ proposed levels of 
both the capacity of dam #3 and the residual flow into 
the downstream subbasin. (In fact, Fu’s proposed price 
declines while Fm’s and Fd’s increase, but these details 
are not apparent from the figure.) The utility compari-
sons are noteworthy: Farmer Fu benefits significantly, 
Fm moderately, and Fd slightly from the tightening of 
the constraint, while both Ev and Tp are negatively 
impacted. That is, each of the parties for whom the 
heterogeneity constraint binds actually benefits from 
a tightening of this constraint!
Why are farmers affected so differently by a 
tightening of the heterogeneity bound? The source 
of the difference has been alluded to already. When 
any farmer reduces the quota that he proposes for 
himself, residual flows increase at every monitoring 
point downstream of that farmer. Thus, when Fu is the 
proposer, a unit decrease in his own proposed quota 
generates, very roughly, three times the increase in 
residual flows that a corresponding decrease made 
by Fd would generate. Consequently, it is much less 
costly for Fu to satisfy the tightening heterogeneity 
bound than it is for either Fm or Fd. Indeed, it would 
be technologically feasible for Fu to satisfy the tighter 
constraint even leaving proposed dam capacities 
unchanged: He could do so by slightly reducing his 
own quota and significantly increasing the other two, 
thereby increasing residual flows at the upstream 
and midstream monitoring points and only slightly 
reducing the flow at the downstream point. Moreover, 
because this adjustment would increase the aggregate Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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number of quotas, the administrator’s budget con-
straint could be satisfied at a lower common price. 
However, even this relatively minor adjustment is sub-
optimal for Fu. It is better for him to reduce his quota 
by a lesser amount, increase the other quotas by more, 
and offset the loss in residual flows relative to the 
previously discussed adjustment by slightly increasing 
the capacity of dam #3. For Fd, on the other hand, a 
quota adjustment exactly comparable to the optimal 
adjustment for Fu would result in very large losses 
in residual flows and, hence, would be infeasible. Fd 
must, therefore, significantly shrink his own quota, 
increase other quotas by much smaller amounts, and, 
to satisfy the budget constraint, increase the common 
price. Like Fu, Fd chooses to increase slightly the 
capacity of dam #3, which reduces slightly the amount 
by which he must shrink his quota, at the cost of an 
increase in the common price.
We now turn to the bottom right panel of Figure 
11. Farmers benefit in expectation as the heterogeneity 
bound tightens because, as expected, they are forced 
to act in a less self-interested fashion. Each farmer 
fares worse from his own proposal but better from 
other farmers’ proposals. The impact for a farmer is 
more favorable the farther upstream is his subbasin as 
explained in the preceding paragraph. It is difficult to 
infer either from the figure or from general principles 
why even farmer Fd should do better in expectation 
when the price he expects to pay increases and the 
quota he expects to receive decreases. We merely 
observe at this point that each farmer is negatively 
impacted by the tighter bound when he is selected 
to be the proposer but is positively impacted when 
another farmer is selected and that the gains are 
weighted more heavily than the loss because farmers 
are risk averse.
Since the tighter bound increases the average 
proposed size of dam #3 and residual flows below 
subbasin D, both Ev and Tp are negatively impacted 
for the usual reason. Thus, all of the effects observed 
in the final round reinforce each other as we move 
backward along the inductive chain so that, in the 
solution to the game, all farmers do better while all 
nonfarmers do worse as the bound tightens.
The Final Round of Bargaining:  
Regime CPIQ, Drought Conditions
Comparing the bottom left panel of Figure 12 with the 
corresponding panel of Figure 11, note that the aver-
age subbasin quota proposal increases by less under 
drought conditions than under normal conditions. 
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The reason is that under drought conditions the 
tangency points represented by the dots in Figure 10 
are now associated with impermissibly low residual 
flows. To satisfy the hydrological constraints in the 
benchmark case, the required dam capacities must 
be so high that even Ds derives negative marginal 
utility from further increases. When the heterogene-
ity bound tightens, the mitigation option that was 
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The Final Round of Bargaining:  
Regime IPCQ, Normal Conditions
It is interesting to compare the panels of Figure 14 to 
the panels of Figure 6, which summarize the corre-
sponding scenario in the spokesman experiment. The 
lower middle panels of both figures are virtually iden-
tical. In both figures, the common quota level, dam 
capacities, and residual flows all decline, reflecting the 
fact that, as the extent of beggar-thy-neighbor behavior 
is limited either endogenously by the spokesman’s 
behavior or exogenously by the tighter heterogeneity 
bound, farmers internalize to a greater extent the true 
cost of buying quotas. On the other hand, the overall 
average price declines in the lower left panel of Figure 
6 while it increases in Figure 14. The reason for this 
difference is that, in contrast to the spokesman, each 
farmer is constrained by the heterogeneity bound from 
allocating prices efficiently even between the other two 
farmers, as in the discussion in section 5.2. In spite 
of this qualitative difference in the price effects, the 
effect on players’ utilities (the bottom right panel of 
Figure 14) is qualitatively similar to the effect of the 
spokesman (Figure 6) in all respects except strategi-
cally unimportant ones. As the bound tightens, the 
strategically important farmer, Fm, pays a higher price 
available under normal conditions—expand dams to 
accommodate Ds’s residual flow requirement, thereby 
limiting the required reduction in mean quotas—is 
no longer such a readily available option for all farm-
ers. In fact, as we have previewed already, Fd has no 
choice but to reduce his proposed size of dam #2 in 
order to satisfy Ds’s participation constraint. The bot-
tom right panel of Figure 12 reports the net effect of 
these changes on players’ utilities, which is much less 
clear-cut than in the other cases we have considered. 
The key points to note are that all farmers’ utilities 
are affected less positively (or more negatively) than 
under normal conditions (Figure 11) while the impact 
on nonfarmers is less negative. In this scenario the 
comparative statics impact of the change is indeter-
minate even in the penultimate round; by the third 
to last round, however, they are resolved (see Figure 
13). The key characteristics of Figure 13 are that the 
overall average quota proposed by farmers is signifi-
cantly lower and the common price is significantly 
higher when the bound tightens. Both the capacity 
of dam #3 and the residual flow in the downstream 
basin increase while the size of dam #2 is significantly 
smaller. Farmer Fm, who is strategically important in 
the sense we discussed in section 5.1, is significantly 
negatively impacted.
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on average for a lower quota level and so is negatively 
impacted. Note also that, because dams and residual 
flows are reduced at a rate that leaves Ds indifferent, 
both Ev and Tp, who dislike dams more than Ds, once 
again benefit from these reductions. These effects 
all reinforce each other and are transmitted back to 
the initial round of the game. In the equilibrium, all 
members of the nonfarmer group benefit monotoni-
cally from the tightening of the heterogeneity bound. 
Farmer Fu, whose mean quota price declines signifi-
cantly, benefits monotonically also while Fm, whose 
demand for quotas is the highest, and Fd both suffer 
monotonically. The average farmer’s equilibrium wel-
fare declines also.
To summarize, the comparative statics impact of 
tightening the heterogeneity bound in regime CPIQ 
depends on hydrological conditions. Ultimately, the 
decisive factor is the level of dam capacity in the 
benchmark case. Under drought conditions, signifi-
cantly higher levels are required to meet hydrological 
constraints, to the point that Ds’s aversion to dams at 
the margin dominates his appetite for residual flows. 
Consequently, when the heterogeneity constraint 
tightens in drought conditions and farmers are obliged 
to transfer quotas to their neighbors, the possibility 
of mitigating the impact by increasing dam size is no 
longer available. So dam sizes contract rather than 
increase, as in normal conditions, with the usual 
consequences. As we shall see hereafter, the role of 
the heterogeneity bound is quite different in regime 
IPCQ.
The Final Round of Bargaining:  
Regime IPCQ, Drought Conditions
The effect of the heterogeneity restriction under 
drought conditions is qualitatively similar to the effect 
under normal conditions. It is summarized in Figure 
15, which is similar in many respects to Figure 14. One 
significant difference is that, under normal conditions, 
there is a slight increase in the overall average price 
proposed by farmers while this price declines under 
drought conditions. Another is that both dam capaci-
ties and quotas fall much more substantially under 
drought conditions than under normal conditions. 
However, these differences do not affect the end result. 
As in normal conditions, when beggar-thy-neighbor 
behavior is mitigated, the key beneficiaries are Ev and 
Tp, who benefit substantially from the reduction in 
dam sizes. The effects of these benefits are transmitted 
up the inductive chain and the solution impacts are 
the same as under normal conditions: All nonfarmers 
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do better in equilibrium while all farmers except Fd, 
including the average farmer, do worse.
The equilibrium comparative statics in this case are 
the reverse of the ones we obtained in the correspond-
ing experiment involving the spokesman (see section 
5.2, especially Figure 8). In the current experiment, 
the primary impact of the tightening heterogeneity 
bound is to mitigate beggar-thy-neighbor activity and 
Fu and Fd both benefit from this. However, Ev and 
Tp both benefit also and to a considerably greater 
extent. By contrast, the spokesman not only mitigates 
beggar-thy-neighbor activity but also rationalizes the 
assignment of prices relative to the farmers’ average 
assignment and, as a result, can obtain more quotas 
for less total expenditure as well as an increase in dam 
size. Though farmer Fu is sacrificed in the process, the 
strategically important farmer, Fm, benefits and Ev and 
Tp are both hurt.
Summary
There are quite striking and unanticipated differences 
between the comparative statics results in section 5.2 
and section 5.3. We had expected both sets of results 
to be driven by the common design factor: The changes 
we introduced were each intended to mitigate, in 
expectation, the divisive tendency of each farmer to 
pursue his own self-interest at the expense of the farm-
er coalition. Indeed, this objective was accomplished 
in all of the experiments we considered: On average, 
in the final round of bargaining, the gap narrowed, at 
least in expectation, between the marginal benefit of 
acquiring an additional quota and the marginal cost 
of obtaining it. However, the equilibrium impacts 
of this accomplishment were quite different in the 
two sections. In all cases but one in section 5.2, the 
equilibrium payoff for the average farmer increased 
with the participation of the spokesman while those 
of nonfarmers decreased, providing a tentative con-
firmation of our conjecture that beggar-thy-neighbor 
activity would be a significant negative contributor to 
coalition performance.
The results of the experiment reported in the cur-
rent section, however, suggest that determinants of 
bargaining success are in fact more subtle. When we 
tightened the heterogeneity bound, beggar-thy-neigh-
bor activity was mitigated on average once again, yet 
in all but one case the average farmer’s equilibrium 
payoff declined. Our comparison of the two sections 
revealed that the more significant contribution made 
by the spokesman was to rationalize the average allo-
cation of quotas and prices across subbasins so that 
residual flows could be increased even as dam capaci-
ties were expanded. These increases in the final round 
proved to be important determinants of equilibrium 
improvement for the average farmer. Specifically, when 
both dam capacities and residual flows increased, the 
rates of increase were determined by Ds’s preferences 
since, by construction, Ds’s participation constraint 
was binding on all farmers in the final round. But rates 
of increase that leave Ds indifferent have a net nega-
tive impact on Ev and Tp, weakening the bargaining 
position of the nonfarmer coalition in the penultimate 
and earlier rounds.Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
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T
his monograph presents a computational applica-
tion of the Rausser-Simon MB framework to a rich 
environment that includes economic, hydrological, 
and strategic considerations. We used the model to 
explore the interactions between the structure of the 
bargaining process and the effective power of bargain-
ing participants. Our results indicate a number of ways 
in which the structure of the negotiation process can 
be an important determinant of negotiation outcomes. 
For participants, there are a number of sources of 
bargaining power. The two direct sources are “access,” 
modeled as the probability of being chosen to make 
a proposal, and “default strength,” or how well the 
participant will fare if the negotiation does not result 
in an agreement. Our analysis identified a number of 
less direct sources of power, including “strategic loca-
tion.” In section 5.1, we showed in a stripped-down 
context that a coalition member’s equilibrium per-
formance is not necessarily monotone in increasing 
his access: There are circumstances in which a player 
can actually benefit in equilibrium when his access is 
transferred to another player whose strategic location 
is more favorable.
Our “spokesman” experiment demonstrated that 
the welfare of farmers as a whole typically increased 
when they were represented by a spokesman charged 
with the objective of maximizing farmers’ average 
welfare. The spokesman improved average farmer wel-
fare in three out of four scenarios. We identified two 
main reasons for this improvement. First, the spokes-
man mitigated, in an expected sense, the tendency 
of individual farmers to adopt beggar-thy-neighbor 
bargaining strategies: In our baseline parameteriza-
tion for regime IPCQ, each farmer in effect purchased 
quotas with other farmers’ money and consequently 
purchased more than he would have done had he been 
obliged to use his own money; in regime CPIQ, each 
farmer kept for himself a disproportionate share of 
the total number of quotas, thus lowering for himself 
the per-unit cost of quotas and raising it for others. 
Second, the spokesman rationalized the allocation 
of prices and quotas across subbasins. There were, 
however, winners and losers from this rationaliza-
tion so that the spokesman’s successes were always 
6. CONCLUSION
obtained at the expense of one of the farmers. This 
suggests that, in order to obtain the coalition’s unani-
mous endorsement of a spokesman’s participation, 
side payments would typically be required in order 
to compensate the losers.
Our “heterogeneity bound” experiment was 
designed to mimic the impact of the spokesman by 
limiting exogenously the extent to which farmers 
could engage in beggar-thy-neighbor behavior. Indeed, 
our exogenous restriction did limit this behavior; how-
ever, the equilibrium consequences of doing so were 
unexpected. We found in three out of four scenarios 
that farmers’ equilibrium welfare actually declined 
as farmers were forced to act in a less selfish manner. 
The unanticipated lesson from this experiment was 
that, while farmers might collectively benefit from a 
restriction that obliged them to act less selfishly, “the 
opposition” might benefit even more so. (Recall that 
“acting less selfishly” meant purchasing fewer quotas 
and this benefited both Ev and Tp while leaving Ds 
indifferent.)
We conclude that the decisive contribution made 
by the spokesman was that he was more effective 
at distributing prices and quotas efficiently across 
subbasins than farmers were when they acted as self-
interested individuals. A careful reading of section 5 
suggests, however, that the implications for coalition 
performance of even this contribution are unlikely to 
be very robust. As we observed in section 5.2, farmer 
Fm was typically a beneficiary of the spokesman’s 
efficiency improvements while Fu was typically a 
loser. Fortunately for the farmers, it was Fm rather 
than Fu who was strategically important in the sense 
we identified in section 5.1. Had the interrelationship 
between hydrological and agricultural conditions 
been different, Fu might have been the strategically 
important farmer, in which case the spokesman’s 
participation might have had the opposite effect on 
equilibrium payoffs.
Linking our analysis to the real-world negotiation 
process it models, we can identify some potential 
reasons for the deadlock in the second stage of 
negotiations and some recommendations for alter-
ing the structure of the negotiation process in order Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
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to increase the probability of its success. First, given 
that the interests of farmers are imperfectly allied, 
the selection of specific negotiation participants is 
an important consideration. However, the lack of 
robustness regarding the effects of the spokesman’s 
participation on farmers’ welfare does not provide 
firm recommendations regarding the selection process 
and the appropriate level of aggregation for farm-
ers’ heterogeneous interests. On the other hand, the 
results of the spokesman experiment suggest that the 
negotiation process should be expanded to allow for 
side payments among participants in order to increase 
efficiency while maintaining unanimity regarding the 
negotiation outcome. Second, an explicit specification 
of the permissible range of outcomes may facilitate 
agreement about allocating water across farmers in a 
manner acceptable to nonfarmer stakeholders; no such 
specification existed in the real negotiation process. 
Third, the only tool the water management agency can 
use in the real world to allocate limited water during a 
drought is to shut water off completely. This enforces 
consistency across farmers regarding their water use 
during a drought and likely was the primary cause 
of the failure to come to agreement regarding how to 
allocate limited supplies during a drought. If all irriga-
tion was stopped in order to protect instream flows, 
the costs would vary widely across farmers, making it 
difficult for them to agree on any proposal that would 
simultaneously satisfy the other stakeholders. Our 
analysis illustrated the value of negotiating explic-
itly over quotas and prices for drought conditions 
separately from normal conditions. Doing so allows 
the farmers’ quotas and prices to reflect the marginal 
value of the water in production they each have while 
simultaneously meeting hydrological constraints and 
satisfying the other stakeholders.
Overall, our analysis suggests that indirect sources 
of bargaining power may critically influence the out-
come of a negotiation process. Comparing our results 
to the stalled Adour negotiation suggests that, when 
designing a negotiation process, policy makers must 
pay attention to the structural details that interact with 
these indirect sources of bargaining power in order to 
ensure that the structure will guide the stakeholders 
to an agreement.Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
42
Adams, G., G.C. Rausser, and L.K. Simon. “Modeling 
Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to Cali-
fornia Water Policy.” Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 30(1) (1996):97–111.
Baron, D.P., and J.A. Ferejohn. “Bargaining and 
Agenda Formation in Legislatures.” American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 77(2) 
(1987):303–309.
Baron, D.P., and J.A. Ferejohn. “Bargaining in Legis-
latures.” American Political Science Review 83(4) 
(1989a):1181–1206.
Baron, D.P., and J.A. Ferejohn. “The Power to Pro-
pose.” Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. P.C. 
Ordeshook, ed., pp. 343–366. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1989b.
Barreteau, O., P. Garin, P.A. Dumontier, and G. Arami. 
Agent Based Facilitation of Water Allocation: Case 
Study in the Drome River Valley.” Group Decision 
and Negotiations 12(5) (2003):441–461.
Becu, N., P. Perez, A. Walker, O. Barreteau, and C.L. 
Page. “Agent Based Simulation of a Small Catch-
ment Water River Management in Northern 
Thailand: Description of the CATCHSCAPE Mod-
el.” Ecological Modeling 170(2) (2003):319–331.
Bennett, E. “Three Approaches to Bargaining in NTU 
Games.” Strategic Bargaining Game Equilibrium 
Models III. R. Selten, ed., pp. 48–69. Berlin, Ger-
many: Springer Verlag, 1991.
Bennett, E. “Multilateral Bargaining Problems.” Games 
and Economic Behavior 19(2) (1997):151–179.
Bennett, E., and E.V. Damme. “Demand Commitment 
Bargaining: The Case of Apex Games.” Strategic 
Bargaining Game Equilibrium Models III. R. Selten, 
ed., pp. 118–140. Berlin, Germany: Springer Ver-
lag, 1991.
Bennett, E., and H. Houba. “Odd Man Out: The Pro-
posal Making Model.” Journal of Mathematical 
Economics 28(4) (1987):375–396.
Binmore, K. “Bargaining and Coalitions.” Game-
Theoretic Models of Bargaining. A. Roth, ed., pp. 
269–304. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985.
Binmore, K., J. McCarthy, G. Ponti, L. Samuelson, 
and A. Shaked. “A Backward Induction Ex-
periment.” Journal of Economic Theory 104(1) 
(2002):48–88.
Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky. “The Nash 
Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling.” Rand 
Journal of Economics 17(2) (1986):176–188.
Binmore, K., A. Shaked, and J. Sutton. “An Outside Op-
tion Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
104(4) (1989):753–770.
Cai, H. “Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Com-
plete Information.” Journal of Economic Theory 
93(2) (2000):260–276.
Cai, H. “Inefficient Markov Perfect Equilibria in 
Multilateral Bargaining.” Economic Theory 22(3) 
(2003):583–606.
Carraro, C., C. Marchiori, and A. Sgobbi. “Applications 
of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues.” Working 
Paper 65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, 2005.
Cemagref. “Schema Directeur de Gestion des Etiages 
de l’Adour.” Working paper, Institution Interde-
partementale pour l’Amenagement Hydraulique 
du Bassin de l’Adour, Montpellier, France, 1994.
Chatterjee, K., B. Dutta, D. Ray, and D. Sengupta. 
“A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bar-
gaining.” Working paper, Pennsylvania State 
University, 1987.
de Mesquita, B. “The War Trap Revisited: A Revised 
Expected Utility Model.” The American Political 
Science Review 79(1) (1985):156–177.
de Mesquita, B. “Multilateral Negotiations: An Analysis 
of the Arab-Israeli Dispute.” International Organi-
zation 44(3) (1990):317–340.
Dinar, A., S. Farolfi, P. Patrone, and K. Rowntree. 
“Negotiation vs. Game Theory Outcomes for 
Water Allocation Problems in the Kat Basin, South 
Africa.” Paper prepared for the Sixth Meeting 
on Game Theory and Practice, Zaragoza, Spain, 
2006.
Dinar, A., A. Ratner, and D. Yaron. “Evaluating Coop-
erative Game Theory in Water Resources.” Theory 
and Decision 32(1) (1992):1–20.
REFERENCESStructure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
43
Doron, G., and I. Sened. “Cooperative and Non-
cooperative Bargaining Models in Political 
Science.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 7(3) 
(1995):235–243.
Doron, G., and I. Sened. Political Bargaining: Theory, 
Practice and Process. London, UK: Sage Publica-
tions, 2001.
Druckman, D. “Determinants of Compromising 
Behavior in Negotiations.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 38(3) (1994):507–556.
Eraslan, H. “Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium 
Payoffs in the Baron Ferejohn Model.” Journal of 
Economic Theory 103(1) (2002):11–30.
Eraslan, H., and A. McLennan. “Uniqueness of 
Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional 
Bargaining.” Working paper, Wharton School, 
University of Pennsylvania, 2006.
Faysse, N. “L’Eau Entre etat et Usager Dans le Bassin 
de l’Adour: De la Gestion Reglementair a: A Ges-
tion Concertee?” Master’s thesis, University of 
Montpellier II, France, 1998.
Faysse, N., and S. Morardet. “La Mise en Place d’Une 
Gestion Negociee de l’Eau en France: l’Exemple de 
la Gestion des Etiages dur le Bassin de l’Adour.” 
Contributions to the 17th International Congress on 
Irrigation and Drainage: Water for Agriculture in 
the Next Millennium, Volume 1F. D. Prinz, ed., pp. 
29–46. New Delhi, India: International Commis-
sion on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID), 1999.
Frisvold, G.B., and K.J. Emerick. “Rural-Urban Water 
Transfers in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region.” 
Paper prepared for the Sixth Meeting on Game 
Theory and Practice, Zaragoza, Spain, 2006.
Fudenberg, D., and D. Levine. “Subgame-Per-
fect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon 
Games.” Journal of Economic Theory 31(2) 
(1983):251–268.
Gleyses, G., and S. Morardet. “Barrage de Garderes-es-
loutenties: Evaluation Economique de l’Agriculture 
Irriguee.” Technical report, Cemagref, Division 
Irrigation, Institution interdepartementale pour 
l’amenagement hydraulique du bassin de l’Adour, 
Compagnie d’Amenagement des Coteaux de Gas-
cogne, Montpellier, France, 1997.
Goodhue, R., S. Morardet, G. Rausser, P. Rio, L. Simon, 
and S. Thoyer. “Les Formes Institutionnelles de la 
Gestion de l’Eau en France et en Californie: Droits 
de Propriete, Decentralisation et Delegation.” 
Working paper, Department of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics, University of California, 
Berkeley, 1999.
Goodhue, R., G. Rausser, L. Simon, and S. Thoyer. 
“Multilateral Negotiations over the Allocation of 
Water: The Strategic Importance of Bargaining 
Power.” Playing Games with Nature: Game Theory, 
Natural Resources and the Environment. A. Dinar, J. 
Albiac, and J. Sanchez-Soriano, eds. Oxford, UK: 
Routledge, forthcoming.
Jackson, M., and B. Moselle. “Coalition and Party 
Formation in a Legislative Voting Game.” Journal 
of Economic Theory 103(1) (2002):49–87.
Jiang, J. “Les Collectivitès Locales et le Droit de l’Eau.” 
Revue de Droit Rural (218) (1993):466–473.
Johnson, E.J., C. Camerer, S. Sen, and T. Rymon. 
“Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: 
Monitoring Information Search in Sequential 
Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Theory 104(1) 
(2002):16–47.
Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. “Reputation and Imperfect 
Equilibrium.” Journal of Economic Theory 27(2) 
(1982):253–279.
Krishna, V., and R. Serrano. “Multilateral Bargaining.” 
Review of Economic Studies 63(1) (1996):61–80.
Kultti, K., and H. Vartiainen. “Von Neumann-Mor-
genstern Stable Sets, Discounting, and Nash 
Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Theory, forth-
coming.
Manzini, P., and M. Mariotti. “A Bargaining Model of 
Voluntary Environmental Agreements.” Journal of 
Public Economics 87(12) (2003):2725–2736.
Manzini, P., and M. Mariotti. “Alliances and Ne-
gotiations.” Journal of Economic Theory 12(1) 
(2005):128–141.
Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. “Predation, Reputation 
and Entry Deterrence.” Journal of Economic Theory 
27(2) (1982):280–312.
Nash, J.F. “The Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica 
18(2) (1950):155–162.
Neelin, J., H. Sonnenschein, and M. Speigel. “A Fur-
ther Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: 
Comment.” American Economic Review 78(4) 
(1988):824–836.Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
44
Norman, P. “Legislative Bargaining and Coalition 
Formation.” Journal of Economic Theory 102(2) 
(2002):322–353.
Osborne, M.J., and A. Rubinstein. Bargaining and Mar-
kets. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1990.
Parrachino, I., A. Dinar, and P. Patrone. “Cooperative 
Game Theory and Its Application to Natural, 
Environmental, and Water Resource Issues: 3. Ap-
plication to Water Resources.” Paper prepared for 
the Sixth Meeting on Game Theory and Practice, 
Zaragoza, Spain, 2006.
Rausser, G.C., and L.K. Simon. “A Non-Cooperative 
Model of Collective Decision Making: A Multi-
lateral Bargaining Approach.” Technical report, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1999.
Roth, A. Axiomatic Models of Bargaining. Berlin, Ger-
many: Springer Verlag, 1979.
Rubinstein, A. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining 
Model.” Econometrica 50(1) (1982):97–109.
Selten, R. “Re-examination of the Perfectness Con-
cept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.” 
International Journal of Game Theory 4(3/4) 
(1975):25–55.
Selten, R. “A Noncooperative Model of Characteristic 
Function Bargaining.” Essays in Game Theory 
and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar 
Morgenstern. V. Boehm and H. Nachtkamp, eds., 
pp. 131–151. Wien-Zurich, Switzerland: Wis-
senschaftsverlag Bibliographisches Institut 
Mannheim, 1981.
Shaked, A., and J. Sutton. The Semi-Walrasian Economy. 
London, UK: London School of Economics, Sun-
tory Toyota International Centre for Economics 
and Related Disciplines Technical Report D.P. 
84/98, 1984.
Speigel, M., J. Neelin, H. Sonnenschein, and A. Sen. 
“Fairness and Strategic Behavior in Two-Person, 
Alternating Offer Games: Results from Bargain-
ing Experiments.” Working paper, University of 
California, Los Angeles, 1990.
Stokman, F., and R. van Oosten. “The Exchange of Vot-
ing Positions: An Object-Oriented Model of Policy 
Networks.” European Community Decision Making: 
Models, Comparisons and Applications. B.B. de 
Mesquita and F. Stokman, eds., pp. 105–127. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.
Sutton, J. “Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An 
Introduction.” Review of Economic Studies 53(5) 
(1986):709–724.
Thiesse, E., D. Loucks, and J. Stedinger. “Computer 
Assisted Negotiation of Water Resource Con-
flicts.” Group Decision and Negotiations 7(2) 
(1998):109–129.
Thomson, W., and T. Lensberg. Axiomatic Theory 
of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
1989.
Thoyer, S., S. Morardet, P. Rio, and R. Goodhue. 
“Comparison of Water Management Decen-
tralisation and Negotiation Processes in France 
and California.” Natures Sciences Societes 12(1) 
(2004):7–17.
Thoyer, S., S. Morardet, P. Rio, L. Simon, R. Goodhue, 
and G. Rausser. “A Bargaining Model to Simulate 
Negotiations between Water Users.” Journal 
of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 4(2) 
(2001).The University of California prohibits discrimination or harassment of any person on the basis of race, color, national 
origin, religion, sex, gender identity, pregnancy (including childbirth, and medical conditions related to pregnancy or 
childbirth), physical or mental disability, medical condition (cancer-related or genetic characteristics), ancestry, marital 
status, age, sexual orientation, citizenship, or status as a covered veteran (covered veterans are special disabled veterans, 
recently separated veterans, Vietnam era  veterans, or any other veterans who served on active duty during a war or in 
a campaign or expedition for which a campaign badge has been authorized) in any of its programs or activities.
University policy is intended to be consistent with the provisions of applicable state and federal laws.
Inquiries regarding the University’s nondiscrimination policies may be directed to the Affirmative Action/Staff Personnel 
Services Director, University of California, Agriculture and Natural Resources, 300 Lakeside Drive, 6th Floor, Oakland, 
CA 94612-3550, (510) 987-0096.
For information on obtaining copies of this publication, see the back cover.Giannini Foundation Monograph 47
 
giAnnini FOUndATiOn mOnOgRAPH SERiES 
T
he Giannini Foundation Monograph Series (ISSN 0575–4208) is comprised of technical research reports   
relating to the economics of agriculture. The series began in its present format in 1967; similar 
technical economic research studies formerly were published in the University of California’s Hilgardia. 
Each monograph is a separate report of research undertaken in the California Experiment Station by 
members of the Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics, University of California. Monographs 
are published at irregular intervals as research is completed and reported.
The Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics was founded in 1930 from a grant made by 
the Bancitaly Corporation to the University of California in tribute to its organizer and past president, 
Amadeo Peter Giannini of San Francisco. The broad mission of the foundation is to promote and 
support research and outreach activities in agricultural economics and rural development relevant to 
California. In line with those goals, the foundation encourages research in various areas of interest 
to agricultural and resource economists and supports dissemination of research findings to other 
researchers and to the public. Foundation membership includes agricultural economists (faculty and 
Cooperative Extension specialists) at the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Davis, 
and at the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Berkeley. Associate members include 
forestry economists in the College of Natural Resources, Berkeley, and economists in the Department 
of Environmental Sciences at Riverside.
This and other Giannini Foundation publications are available in PDF format online at   
http://giannini.ucop.edu/publications.htm. Copies of this report may be ordered from University of 
California Agriculture and Natural Resources Communication Services.
Peter Berck 
Giannini Foundation Series Editor 
University of California, Berkeley
Julian Alston 
Associate Editor 
University of California, Davis
Julie McNamara 
Managing Editor 
University of California, Davis
Angie Erickson 
Technical Editor 




Agriculture and Natural Resources (ANR)
Communication Services
6701 San Pablo Avenue, 2nd Floor
Oakland, California 94608–1239
Telephone: 800.994.8849 / 510.642.2431
Fax: 510.643.5470
E-mail: danrcs@ucdavis.edu
Visit the ANR Communication Services 
Web site at http://anrcatalog.ucdavis.edu
Visit the giannini Foundation web site at http://giannini.ucop.edu